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CHAPTER L INTRODUCTION 
How can cooperation among states be explained? It is proposed to investigate 
the problem of explaining voluntary cooperation among international actors under 
a condition of anarchy, that is, interaction in the absence of a central authority. 
The study will endeavor to show that cooperative norms develop among states in­
teracting in the presence of superordinate conditions, that is, when the actors rec­
ognize that the problem can only be solved through a cooperative effort and also 
when they recognize that the threat posed by the problem is so critical that it can­
not be ignored because failure to address it would impose an unacceptably high 
cost on them. 
Based on Sherif et al. (1961) superordinate goal theory, a model of state inter­
action will be developed. Hypotheses will be formulated and tested. Data will be 
used from a sample of historic cases of states interacting in the presence of those 
situations that give rise to what Sherif called superordinate goals. The research will 
begin with a study of the theoretical and empirical literature and will conclude with 
an analysis of cases and a discussion of the findings and their implications. 
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Statement of the Problem 
Under a condition of anarchy, cooperation and coordination are assumed to be 
problematic (Olson, 1965; Jervis, 1978), because states have no incentive to live up 
to agreements and could take advantage of the cooperative behavior of other stat­
es. Examples range from arms races to acid rain, the latter reflecting collective 
failure in pollution control. 
While many cases where cooperative failure could be noted, the reality of in­
ternational relations is that cooperation is widespread. Successful efforts range 
from arms reduction agreements and tariff agreements to resource cartels like the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). So why does cooperation 
emerge in some cases and not others? 
This study will examine concepts suggested by Axelrod (1986) and others, that 
shared norms of cooperation emerge at the international level and account for the 
success of actors to achieve mutually desired goals without a central authority. 
The concept of superordinate goals (Sherif et al. 1961) will be utilized to explain 
how cooperative norms emerge. 
Oye (1985) raises the fundamental question: if international interactions ap­
proximate a Hobbesian state of nature, then how does cooperation emerge at all? 
Also why does it emerge in some cases and not others? One basic assumption of 
this study is that norms of cooperative behavior emerge in international group in­
teractions as they do in other group settings. Some basic questions to be addressed 
are the following: How do we account for the emergence of norms at the interna­
tional level when actors have unequal power and basic values are in conflict? What 
impact does the number of actors have on how quickly cooperation is achieved? 
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Does the number of actors or the problem issue affect the mechanism for monit­
oring compliance? How are the norms sustained and when do they change? 
Rationale for the Study 
An understanding of the conditions favoring the emergence of cooperative 
norms could be applied to aid cooperation and coordination for groups in conflict, 
from the local village to the international level. A superordinate condition in a 
developing country that would require all parties to cooperate to solve, would be, 
for example, that of a firewood shortage. As increasing numbers of trees are cut 
to be used as fuel for cooking, three problems result. First, deforestation occurs. 
Because trees are freely available to anyone who wishes to cut them (a public 
good), any individual can take a free ride on the voluntary contributions of others 
who practice cooperation by investment in a more fuel efficient stove (to reduce 
their firewood consumption) or practice cooperation by their investment of time and 
money in planting new trees. Public goods theory (Olson 1965) assumes that 
actors in such a situation would have a dominant strategy of taking a free ride on 
the contributions of others. That is, an individual would continue to cut the addi­
tional trees made available by the cooperation of others who invest in fuel efficient 
stoves, without oneself contributing (he or she does not invest in a fuel efficient 
stove nor help in replanting trees). The end result is that as more individuals at­
tempt to take a firee ride on the trees made available by the voluntary contribu­
tions of others, the trees (public good) become less available and the area becomes 
deforested. 
Two other problems also result as the competition over trees for cooking fuel 
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increases, that of soil erosion and depletion. As more trees are cut, wind and rain 
driven erosion increase. Finally, as the value of the firewood increases, animal 
dung which would normally be used as fertilizer becomes a cooking fuel substitute 
and is sold rather than returned to the land. The loss of the animal fertilizer can 
then further accelerate the depletion problem as crops planted on the deforested 
land remove nutrients normally replaced by the dung, so the productivity drops. 
So all parties end up worse off than if they would have cooperated to reduce 
the rate of tree cutting and invest in stoves and replanting. 
At the international level the study could aid efforts of actors achieve coopera­
tive outcomes to global "public goods" problems, such as reduction of pollution, 
maintenance of fish stocks, and reduction of arms spending. 
Objectives of the Stn  ^
This study will review the literature relating to the generation of norms at the 
international level from three areas, sociology and social psychology, game theory, 
and regime theory. Based on the review of the literature, independent and depen­
dent variables will be identified, and a model developed to approximate state inter­
actions in the generation of cooperative norms. 
A data set will be generated from a variety of historic and contemporary cases. 
A set of hypotheses will then be developed and the model will be evaluated with 
the data set. The findings and implications for the model will then be discussed. 
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CHAPTER n. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Three kinds of literature are most useful for understanding the problem of 
international voluntary cooperation in the absence of a sovereign: norm governed 
behavior, game theory and analysis of regimes. 
Emergence of Nonns 
Relatively few authors employ the concept that social norms are generated 
through interaction among international actors and that these norms then regulate 
their behavior. Axelrod (1986) suggests that norms may provide a mechanism for 
regulating conflict in groups (states) where no sovereign authority exists. He inves­
tigated the emergence and stability of norms using a game theory computer simula­
tion of actors employing limited rationality. He termed this a "groups use what 
works" trial and error method from which norms evolve. The simulation results 
noted the conditions under which norms are generated and maintained. These 
include dominance, deterrence, internationalization, law and reputation. One inter­
esting result of Axekod's search for mechanisms that sustain established or partially 
established norms was the meta norm, the treatment of nonpunishment as if it 
were another form of defection. Thus a player will be vengeful against someone 
who observed a defection but did not punish it. 
Axelrod does not develop rigorous measures to show how norms arise and are 
maintained. However his examples of international behavior clarify that norms are 
at work in coordinating behavior among states and regulating conflict. This should 
serve as a point of departure from the traditional assumption that actor behaviors 
follow from calculations based on beliefs about the future, to a focus on how groups 
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interacting over time generate norms to solve common problems and ways to sustain 
them. 
Opp (1982) presents three ways that norms may emerge: institutional forma­
tion, where they are prescribed by existing institutions; social contract through bar­
gaining; and evolutionary formation, a process which begins with recurrent behav­
ior, leading to preferences and integration of norms and enforcement sanctions. 
One important hypothesis proposed in his model suggests that, with respect to pub­
lic goods, externalities may be eliminated by creating norms. Neither Opp nor 
Axelrod (1986) developed this hypothesis further. However it will be utilized later 
in this study and combined with findings from Sherif (1966) to suggest emergent 
norm generated solutions to various international public goods dilemmas. 
Opp (1979) discusses the emergence of norms in comparing theories from 
sociology and economics. Opp cites the relief thesis, which explains that if we did 
not have norms to regulate social interaction, then people would experience high 
insecurity concerning expectations in the behavior of others. The relief thesis states, 
"If there is insecurity with regard to the behavior of others,-then norms emerge 
which regulate the insecurity". One problem here is that it does not explain which 
norms will be generated. 
From economics, Opp cites utility theory to explain emergence of norms. Ac­
cording to the utility theory, norms develop from conditions of insecurity, where 
insecurity brings costs to actors, and the generation of norms reduces these costs. 
Opp notes that utility theory has an advantage in that it can explain which specific 
norms arise. The explanation comes from knowing the costs and benefits associat­
ed with the norm. 
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Although no suggested measures for operationalizing the hypothesis are pres­
ented, Opp's article provides additional support for the general hypothesis that 
norms are generated in the interaction among groups in the presence of public 
goods. 
An important study that provided an explanation for intergroup behavior was 
a series of experiments conducted by Sherif et al. (1961). Shérif was looking for a 
means of reducing conflict between groups. He proposed that groups would coop­
erate when there were urgent compelling goals, goals which could not easily be 
ignored and that could not be achieved by a single group's efforts or resources. 
He called this condition a superordinate goal, implying that the situation would 
require groups to give up certain subordinate sovereign goals and combine their 
efforts and resources to address a more important goal. 
Sherif (1966) operationalized his concept of superordinate goals by introducing 
a series of external threats (for example a breakdown in the water system and a 
potential loss of food at a time when groups were thirsty and hungry) that could 
only be solved by the two groups joining together and organizing their efforts and 
resources to address the problem. He demonstrated that a series of achievable -
superordinate goals would reduce group conflict. In effect, he set up a condition 
where two ingroups who viewed each other as outgroups integrated themselves 
into a single new ingroup. Sherif's superordinate goal model will be described in 
detail in the theory section. 
Sherif's model of groups interacting under conditions of superordinate goals 
will be used to provide a framework for understanding international cooperation in 
the absence of a sovereign. When interaction between groups takes place at the 
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international level, under the criterion of a "superordinate condition", the groups 
are compelled (by the external threat) to form a task oriented group and generate 
group norms to address the superordinate threat. 
Groups interacting in a public goods dilemma also appear to meet Sherif's criteria 
of groups under conditions of superordinate goals, where, in this case, the external 
threat or compelling goal is that of assuring the provision of the public good. 
A number of other studies substantiate Sherif's concept of the relation of ex­
ternal threat and group cohesion. A few of these studies will be reviewed briefly. 
The study of disaster situations, for instance, also demonstrates the develop­
ment of norms between groups. These studies generally have an external threat as 
an independent variable and group cohesion as the dependent variable. This litera­
ture is relevant for two reasons. First, disaster or crises situations are equivalent 
to the common threat or compelling goal that cannot be ignored by groups, which 
were described by Sherif (1966). Second, the group response to the common threat 
situation of forming a new task oriented group is equivalent to the task oriented 
group that forms to address Sherif's superordinate goal condition. 
Brophy (1945) studied antiblack prejudice among white seamen and found a 
negative relationship between prejudice among white seamen and the number of 
years at sea with blacks. He notes the most significant attitude change was among 
white seamen who worked with blacks in situations of danger and other conditions 
where group survival depended on cooperation. This threat induced cooperation 
is similar to that generated by Sherif's superordinate condition. 
Levine and Cambell (1972) also found that cooperation with ethnic groups is 
high not only in situations of war but also for situations of general threats to the 
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group. 
Fritz and Williams (1957) found that group solidarity is a function of members 
sharing a common threat and common suffering. They note that the common 
threat/suffering experience will "produce a breakdown of preexisting social distinc­
tions". Taylor, Zurcher and Key (1970) observe a similar finding, that solidarity is 
a function of sharing a common group task of high priority and whose attainment 
is successful. Also Lang and Kurt (1964) argue that group solidarity will break 
down if the disaster situation threatens the group over a long period of time. 
Depending on the circumstances of the threat or disaster, Wolfenstein (1957) 
notes that a disaster in which there is competition for the means of survival, can 
either bring out the best in people (group cooperation) or the worst in people. 
Foreman (1963) notes that groups can respond with resignation if they perceive the 
situation to be futile. 
The requirements for group integration in threat situations are summarized in 
Fritz (1961): the threat or danger comes from the outside and the source can be 
clearly identified; the immediate needs of the group are clearly recognizable and 
direct action can be initiated with visible results; and the danger and suffering are 
equally shared, so all are affected indiscriminately. 
The preceding studies include both field analysis of threat situations and ex­
perimental studies. Although most of these studies use the individual as the unit 
of analysis, it is assumed that the basic threat/group cohesion hypothesis can be 
equally applied to intergroup behavior in response to a common threat, based on 
the findings of Sherif (1966). 
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Game Theoiy and Public Goods 
A large number of articles and books has been published that describe state 
behavior and that of other actors in terms of game theory. Game theory examines 
interdependent decision structures, where the benefits of a particular decision by 
one actor affects the choices that other actors face. This interdependent relation­
ship between actor choices is also found in public goods. 
A public good is characterized by two properties, jointness of supply and non-
excludability. When a good is completely indivisible, that is, consumption by one 
actor does not affect the consumption of others, then the good is said to be in joint 
supply. The good is nonexcludable if, for all practical purposes, it is not practical 
to exclude anyone from consuming the good. For example, consider a common 
resource like ocean fisheries that lie outside a nation's exclusive economic zone. 
Any actor with appropriate fishing equipment can harvest fish, so the resource is 
nonexcludable. However, one actor's harvest of fish can reduce that of another 
actor, so the good (fish) is not completely indivisible. This means that the good is 
an impure public good. 
Public goods like clean air and national security can also be understood by 
contrasting them with private goods, where actors can be excluded from consump­
tion with relative ease, such as consumption of bread. 
Public goods theory is relevant to this study because it identifies situations 
where actors can take a firee ride on the contributions of others. However, when 
the group is large and actors do not become free riders but instead cooperate to 
ensure provision of the good, then we are left without an explanation for coopera­
tion in the presence of public goods. Economists suggest that supranational struc­
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tures develop to solve the problem of market failure at the international level for 
important public goods, as in pollution, fisheries and so on. This perspective will 
be addressed in the section on regimes. 
Game theory is commonly used to model public goods. Variations of noncoop-
erative games are employed, where no communication occurs and where actors 
make choices of either a continuous variable or a binary choice. A review of pub­
lic goods can be found in Russett and Sullivan (1971). 
Most commonly, the literature on game theory applications of public goods 
deals with binary choice models, because they are simpler models of actor behav­
ior. Taylor (1976) and Hardin (1982) provide a good review of noncooperative 
games that involve binary choices. Here, two actors choose strategies of coopera­
tion (C) or defection (D) and receive payoffs that depend on both player's choices. 
The interaction is commonly represented with preferences arranged in a 2 by 2 
matrix. The preference order of the binary model is often that of the Prisoner's 
Dilemma (PD), where each actor most prefers the combination D C, second pre­
fers C C, third prefers D D, and least prefers C D. Here the first letter represents 
the choice of one actor and the second letter the choice of the other actor. 
The classical PD or chicken games were designed to be played only once and 
involve limited communication and only two actors (Luce and Raiffa, 1957). 
Because the conditions of single play and restricted communication limited the 
application of game theory in modeling social interaction, Taylor (1976) generalized 
the model to an n-player setting. Taylor included the more realistic condition of 
iterated games, where actors can expect to meet repeatedly for a distant future. 
He notes that in choosing a strategy under these conditions, each actor is aware 
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that his or her present decision will most likely influence the future choices of oth­
ers and thus his or her own future payoff. 
Taylor (1976) introduces what he calls the supergame, where the game is re­
peated and players reduce their discounting of the future payoff (its value increases 
relative to the present payoff). Under these conditions, Taylor shows it is rational 
for players to cooperate and employ a conditional cooperation strategy, that is, a 
tit-for-tat behavior. This allows for punishing the other player for failure to coop­
erate and rewards the player for cooperation. 
Axelrod (1984) investigated the evolution of cooperation in repeated games 
using a computer simulation. He showed that two players using tit-for-tat, who do 
recognize that the future offers a higher payoff for cooperation over noncoopera-
tion, could sustain their cooperation. However, Axelrod's analysis consisted of 
rounds of two players, whereas public goods usually involve many players, so the 
generalization to the n-actor case may be questioned. 
In a symposium on cooperation under anarchy, Oye (1985), Snidal (1985), 
Jervis (1985), Van Evera (1985), Downs et al. (1985), and Axelrod and Keohane 
(1985), have examined game theory factors that promote cooperation. They note 
the effects of structure on cooperation along three variables: payoff structures in­
volving mutual interests; the shadow of the future (where future payoffs are more 
valued relative to the present payoff); and the number of actors. Various historic 
cases are reviewed to show support for the promotion of cooperation by the above 
independent variables. Among the problems identified were: 1) how to provide 
incentives for cooperation so it would be rewarded over the long term and defectors 
punished; 2) how to monitor behavior so cooperators and defectors could be 
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identified; 3) how to focus rewards on cooperators and retaliation on defectors; 
and 4) how to link issues in positive ways. Additionally it was noted that the use 
of reciprocity was fundamental in achieving the above issues. 
A number of authors have offered critiques of the shortcomings of game theo­
ry in modeling international behavior. Stroebe and Frey (1982) and Wagner (1983) 
both point out a number of reasons that two actor games such as the PD are not 
appropriate for public goods "commons dilemmas". They note that the PD, Chick­
en, and Stag Hunt are inadequate because they assume actor preferences are given, 
actors meet only once and they make decisions without communication or knowl­
edge of the other actor's decision. Actors generally have a history of interaction 
and normally expect to meet repeatedly in a commons dilemma for a distant future. 
They vary in degrees of communication and generally have at least some ability to 
monitor each other's behavior. Additionally there can be more than two actors and 
they may have more choices than only cooperation and defection. 
On the positive side, it was noted that the &ee rider hypothesis tends to be 
supported as group size increases (Dawes et al., 1977; Marwell and Schmidt, 1972). 
Also it was found that allowing communication among actors leads to more cooper­
ation (Dawes and Orbell, 1981; Bendor and Mookheijee, 1987). 
An interesting overall review of the problems and potentials for game theory 
is given by Jervis (1988). Jervis focuses on the importance of understanding how 
actor preferences are arrived at and that preferences may change with each inter­
action, a condition with which that game theory does not deal. He notes that the 
basic concepts used in game theory, such as cooperation, defection and power, are 
not well defined. Also, perceptual bias may distort recording of interactions as 
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cooperative or not. He also notes that actors in a security dilemma may refuse to 
cooperate with others not because they seek a positive gain of exploitation but 
because they fear that their own cooperative behavior might be exploited by the 
others. 
Jervis concludes with an interesting discussion on the changing belief and value 
structures of actors. He notes that the concepts of self interest can be expanded 
to include others, as it is not inevitable for people to always care more about 
themselves, their group or their nation than those across the border. He suggests 
that values expressed in cultural practices of morality, fairness and obligation may 
account for more cooperation than the PD model suggests. Jervis does not develop 
any theory for accounting for norms beyond a general discussion. He suggests that 
it would be useful to understand how norms come into existence as valued and 
expected behaviors. 
To summarize the game theory and public goods literature, we see that most 
studies draw upon experimental works from social psychology or abstract mathe­
matical models of utility from economics. Only a few studies look at historic cases 
and even those vary in their definitions of cooperation and defection. None provid­
es rigorous measures. 
Regime Theoiy 
The third category in the literature review covers regimes or institutional or­
ganizations as determinants of international collective behavior. Krasner (1983:2) 
provides a widely accepted definition of regimes; "sets of implicit or explicit prin­
ciples, norm rules and decision making procedures around which actor expectations 
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converge in a given area." Economists describe a similar concept, which they call 
supranational structures (Sandler, 1980). These are generated by nonmarket inter­
national public goods problems. Economists suggest these structures emerge when­
ever transaction benefits are greater than costs. 
One important question asked in this study is how do regimes form and how 
do they change? Stein (1982) gives a good overview of regime formation and 
change. He notes that regimes are interest based, such that the same forces that 
prompt individuals to bind themselves to escape the state of nature also motivate 
them to coordinate their actions. States thus recognize situations where rational 
selfinterested calculation motivate them to give up their sovereignty in some areas 
in favor of joint decision making. He emphasizes the condition of interdependence 
where an actor's payoffs are a function of other's choices as well their own. 
Stein explains regime formation as a product of preferences, many of which 
are rooted in structural factors. The argument is that regimes are determined by 
interests and interests are determined by the distribution of power among states. 
State distribution of power then determines the context of interaction and prefer­
ences. Additional structural factors of knowledge, teclmology, and internal national 
character, also shape actor preferences and so shape the regime. 
Stein briefly notes that the same factors that explain regime formation also 
explain their maintenance, change and dissolution. Regimes are maintained as long 
as the interests that produced them remain. When the interests shift, the regime 
may change or end completely. He also notes that cases can be found where inter­
ests that gave rise to regimes shift or the distribution of power changes but the 
regime remains unchanged. The explanation lies in the fact that once in place, the 
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costs of creating a new regime may be too high, because the cost of calculating 
interaction transaction costs may be high. These costs are less when actors have 
patterned expected behaviors guided by the regime. 
Haggard and Simmons (1987) present a review of regime theory that begins 
with a survey of definitions of regimes. They suggest a number of dimensions along 
which regimes can vary over time or across cases. They note these dimensions 
could be used to operationalize regime change. They include strength, organiza­
tional form, scope and allocation mode. They conclude with a review of the theo­
retical approaches to explaining regimes, including structural functional theory, 
game theory, and cognitive theory. 
Economists study regimes under the general heading of nonmarket suprana­
tional structures. These range firom environmental and fisheries pacts to public 
health and arms agreements. A good introduction to such collective action prob­
lems can be found in Scott (1980). He outlines strategy options that nations have 
with respect to solving the dilemma of supplying environmental public goods. Scott 
also briefly reviews cases of pollution and fisheries pacts. 
Although they do not specifically point out how these international agreements 
originate, they do provide a sound basis for their functional operation rooted in 
economic theory as to why actors find it rational to enter into agreements. Sandler 
(1980) provides a good review of cases of normaarket structures ranging from en­
vironmental, fisheries and public health to arms issues. 
Young (1989) suggests a number of determinants that may be associated with 
successful formation of regimes, including solutions that can be expressed in simple 
terms, the availability of clear cut compliance mechanisms, crises like situations to 
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motivate negotiation, innovative leadership by motivated actors, the availability of 
equity for all actors in the regime outcome, and when the issue can be expressed 
in contractarian terms. He reviews a number of environmental and natural resource 
cases where regimes exist to support his determinants. While the cases examined 
and the discusion of the determinants provide some insight into regime formation, 
other than the suggestion of institutional bargaining. Young does not provide a solid 
theory upon which to explain why regimes emerge in some cases and not in others. 
The literature reviewed in the regimes section does not present straightforward 
operational measures that tell when goals among actors become compelling enough 
to prompt actors to cooperate as Sherif (1966) suggests. They do, however, give 
clues to several areas where historic cases have been used to support regime theo­
ry-
From the literature review it appears that to construct a model and measures 
to explain cooperation in the absence of a sovereign, the best source of support for 
theory will come from Sherif and related studies dealing with external threat and 
group cohesion. After a set of measures are defined to identify the superordinate 
goals to be generated, then cases can be selected and tested. The literature sug­
gests a few resources firom previous case studies, as in fisheries, the environment 
and disarmament. Other issue areas could be tested, as they fulfill the conditions 
of being an international public good dilemma, the interaction is ongoing and the 
goals are compelling or in some cases critical. 
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CEAPTER m. THEORY 
Recall that the objective of this study is to explain how voluntary cooperation 
can occur among international actors in the absence of a sovereign. From the 
literature review, it was noted that international actors should fail to cooperate 
without a central authority (Hobbes, 1651). Olson's (1965) theory of public goods 
suggests that large groups would either fail to voluntarily provide themselves with 
desired public goods, or would provide them at insufficient levels due to the tempt­
ation and opportunity to take a free ride on the contributions of others. 
Then how is it possible to account for the voluntary cr opération and coordina­
tion that occurs at the international level in issue areas ra ging from coordination 
in the placement of geosynchronous satellites, to cooperation in the General Agree­
ments on Tariff and TVade (GATT) and arms control treaties? 
The theoretical review section below presents a number of perspectives that 
attempt to explain voluntary cooperative behavior, and its failure, among interna­
tional actors. The review begins with theories that fall into the category called 
realistic conflict theory. This designation was given by Campbell (1965) to a cate­
gory of theories containing the common assumption, that groups consists of rational 
actors and that intergroup conflicts develop from incompatible goals as groups 
compete for scarce resources. Realistic conflict theory consists of the following: 
The pioneering work of Muzafer Sherif (1966) in the superordinate goal theory of 
intergroup cooperation and conflict reduction, game theory (Rapoport and 
Chammah, 1965), and the theory of public goods (Olson, 1965). 
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Superordinate Goal Theory of Intergroup Cooperation and Conflict Reduction 
A study of the generation and influence of intergroup norms must begin with 
the classical work of Muzafer Sherif (1966) who bases his theory on years of ex­
perimental findings. From Sherif's point of view, intergroup conflict does not origi­
nate with a few hostile individuals but comes from incompatibility of goals. The 
incompatibility of group goals determines the nature of intergroup behavior (Sherif, 
1966:63). 
Before proceeding further in laying out Sherif's theory, it is necessary to specify 
some of the definitions of concepts he used. Sherif (1966:12) defines the group as 
"a social unit that consists of a number of individuals, (1) who at a given time, have 
role and status relationships with one another stabilized in some degree and (2) 
who possess a set of values or norms regulating the attitude and behavior of indi­
vidual members, at least in matters of consequence to them". Group norms are 
"the expected and individual modes of behavior, defining for members the bounds 
of acceptable behavior. Thus a norm is not necessarily a statistical average of ob­
served behaviors by persons in a group. The expected or ideal modes of behavior 
defined by norms relate to motives and goals members share in common. They 
concern the existence and perpetuation of the group itself. They regulate the re­
ciprocal expectations of members in the functioning of organizational patterns". 
Intergroup relations are, "the interactions between two or more groups and their 
respective members. Whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, collec­
tively or individually with another group or its members in terms of their group 
identification, we have an instance of intergroup behavior" (Sherif, 1966:12). 
Sherif's research is presented in several publications (Sherif, 1953; and Sherif 
20 
et al. 1961). He and his associates conducted a series of experiments on intergroup 
behavior in three successive stages. Stage 1 focused on intergroup formation, to 
gain an understanding of structures, attitudes, beliefs, values and norms. Stage 2 
analyzed intergroup competition, conflict, hostility, intergroup stereotypes and 
ingroup solidarity resulting from competition among groups with conflicting goals. 
Stage 3 was oriented to the reduction of intergroup conflict using superordinate 
goals. These are goals "that are urgent, compelling and highly appealing for all 
groups involved, but carmot be achieved by a single group through its own efforts 
and resources" (Sherif et al. 1961:50-51). 
Sheriffs theory of intergroup behavior can be presented in a series of hypothe­
ses relevant to each stage of the experiment. These three stages and hypotheses 
are presented in Appendix D. 
The essence of Sharif's model is that groups in conflict will tend to establish 
norms of cooperation when they are confronted by a superordinate threat. This 
can be seen in the following two hypotheses from his model: "when groups in a 
state of friction are brought into contact under conditions embodying superordinate 
goals whose attainment is compellingly desired by each group, but which cannot be 
achieved by the efforts of one group alone, they will tend to cooperate toward the 
common goal"; and "cooperation between groups, necessitated by a series of situa­
tions embodying superordinate goals, will have a cumulative effect in the direction 
of reducing existing conflicts between groups and unfavorable attitudes of individual 
members". 
The principal focus of the model to be used in this study will be in the appli­
cation of the concept of superordinate goals to problems of cooperation and coor­
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dination by actors at the international level. Here "actor" is defined as states, or 
representatives of various states (as in commercial fishing vessels or industries dis­
charging pollution). 
Returning again to Sherif's definition of superordinate goals, we find there are 
two key components in it that have important parallels in the international prob­
lems this study will address. 1) The goals are urgent, compelling and highly appeal­
ing for all groups involved. Here the concepts urgent, compelling and highly ap­
pealing were operationalized, in one measure, through the loss of food and water 
when all group members were hungry and thirsty. In effect the concept of urgent 
and compelling goals are those that could be viewed as an immediate, high level 
and mutual threat to the welfare of each group and to each individual in the group. 
Additionally, Sherif (1966:88) notes "that a superordinate goal supersedes other 
goals each group may have, singly or in common with others, hence its attainment 
may require subordination of either singular or common goals". At the international 
level this may imply that states or other actors must subordinate their sovereignty 
over specific issues to reach the more compelling superordinate goal. 2) The goals 
canno be attained through the efforts or resources of any one group but only 
through the participation of all. Because superordinate goals are unattainable by 
one group, Sherif (1966:89) notes that therefore superordinate goals are not the 
same as "common goals", those that groups find appealing and singly attainable. 
This part of the definition stresses the concept of interdependence which is associ­
ated with superordinate goals and does not occur with common goals. It makes 
clear the requirement that groups must be aware that their welfare depends on 
each other. 
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Superordinate goals set up the "motive conditions" for the formation of a new 
task oriented group (as in Sherif's stage 1, hypotheses 1 and 2), which is now com­
posed of all the individuals who had earlier been outgroup members. Interaction 
between members of this new group, under conditions of superordinate goals, 
generates a new group hierarchy and new norms oriented toward attainment of the 
superordinate goal. This interaction allows for reduction of intergroup conflict and 
generation of an ingroup solidarity attitude (see Sherif's stage 3 in Appendix D). 
Thus Sherif gives us a theoretical framework to understand intergroup coopera­
tion in the absence of a sovereign. When the interaction between actors takes 
place at the international level, under the criteria of superordinate goals, the actors 
are compelled to form a task oriented group and to generate a group structure and 
norms to assure attainment of the superordinate goal. It appears that the condi­
tions that generate superordinate goals (of attainment of interdependence and a 
mutual threat requiring subordination of sovereign interests) allow the new group 
structure and norms to serve as substitutes for a global sovereign. 
The model presented in Chapter IV is based on Sherif's (1966) theory of group 
formation and his concept of superordinate goals to explain how voluntary inter­
group cooperation can occur at the international level in the absence of a global 
sovereign. 
The superordinate condition criteria of urgent goals that supersede sovereign 
goals and of goals whose attainment is dependent on the cooperation of all groups, 
also occurs at the international level in collective action problems among states or 
other international actors. Intergroup collective action problems meeting this crite­
ria have been described in public goods theory and modeled in game theory as the 
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Prisoner's Dilemma and the Game of Chicken. One additional game theory model 
is that covering dilemmas of common aversion, more commonly known as coordina­
tion models. 
Public Goods and Game Theoiy 
The theory of public goods and the prisoner's dilemma model attempt to ex­
plain the problem of achieving cooperation in intergroup settings where self interest 
contradicts the collective interest, and there is no sovereign to set standards or 
enforce any behavior. Actors in a dilemma of common aversion disagree on the 
most preferred outcome but do agree on the outcome they all wish to avoid. This 
requires coordination that allows actor expectations to converge and thus avoid the 
worst outcome (Stein, 1982). 
The problem of collective action by groups involving public goods has been 
described by Olson (1965). It should be recalled that a public good is one which 
is defined by two properties, jointness of supply and impossibility of exclusion. If 
a good is in joint supply, then one actor's consumption of it does not prevent an­
other member of the public from consuming the same amount of the good. If the 
good is also characterized by impossibility of exclusion, that is, it is impossible or 
very costly to prevent an actor from the public from consuming it, then anyone can 
consume the good even if they do not contribute toward its provision. Hardin 
(1982:19) notes that it is difficult to find many goods that are actually pure public 
goods which groups seek. Hardin suggests we instead refer to them as collective 
goods and focus on the collective provision of the goods. When we have the im­
possibility of exclusion of consumption, the temptation to become a "free rider" 
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emerges. That is, once the good is available and it is not easy to exclude anyone 
from consumption, actors are tempted to consume the good without contributing to 
its production. 
The collective action problem at the international level arises in connection 
with collective provision of goods that have properties of both indivisibility and 
nonexcludability. Here, as noted earlier, actors are tempted to become "free riders" 
and benefit firom the good provided by the contributions of others, without them­
selves contributing to its provision. The problem is, if all members attempt to be­
come free riders, then the collective good will not be provided at all. Olson (1965) 
notes that large groups would fail to provide themselves with desired collective 
goods due to the temptation to become free riders. In small groups the good is 
more likely to be provided because it is easier to monitor each actor's contribution. 
The problem of provision of collective goods described by Olson (1965) has 
been modeled by Hardin (1982) in game theory using the prisoner's dilemma (PD). 
The classic model PD consists of two actors who meet only once and choose simul­
taneously cooperation or defection without awareness of the other actor's choice. 
In this situation, each actor would have a dominant strategy to choose the highest 
payoff, defection! However with noncooperation as the dominant choice, the result 
for both actors is that they end up worse off than if they would have cooperated. 
See Figure 1. 
Hardin (1982) has shown that the problem of collective action can be present­
ed as an n-person repeated PD with a preference structure similar to that of the 
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Figure 1. Two actor prisoner's dilemma payoff structure, where the payoff is 4 > 
3 > 2 > 1 
The essence of the PD problem lies in the preference structure that leads to 
self interested behavior, which contradicts the collective interest of reaching the 
-iVgd good, as in not arming or not over harvesting ocean fish and so on. Here 
again Sherif's criteria of superordinate goals may explain cooperation that allows 
provision of collectively desired goods, even when classic theories such as Hobbes 
and the PD would suggest that actors should fail. 
Sherif's concept of superordinate goals may also be applied, in some degree, 
to collective goods problems that resemble the game of chicken. Taylor and Ward 
(1982) describe ecological and environmental collective goods as resembling the 








Figure 2. Two actor chicken game preference structure, where the payoff is 4 > 3 
> 2 > 1 
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Consider the following example of a chicken situation. Assume two states sepa­
rated by a common river. Both states wish to dump industrial waste into the river 
that can only absorb waste from one state and still remain usable, as dumping 
wastes from both states would push the river to ecological catastrophe. The result­
ing ecological catastrophe would be so threatening, that although each state prefers 
first to free ride on the restraint of the other rather than cooperate, each state 
would prefer unilateral restraint (not pollute) over catastrophe, if the other state 
pollutes. 
Dilemmas of common aversion are represented by coordination games. Figure 
3 presents structures for actors with indifference as to the preferred outcome and 
Figure 4 presents the preferences for actors with divergent interests, that is where 
each actor most prefers a different outcome. 
Actor B 
1 2 
1 left left 0 0 
Actor A 
2 0 0 right right 
Figure 3. Dilemma of common aversion with common indifference 
for driver preference side of the street 
Figure 3 presents an example of coordination with indifference for drivers 
deciding on using the left or right side of the road to drive on. Neither driver 
cares which side of the road is used so long as both drivers use the same choice. 
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In this case, coordination requires that actors communicate and not act indepen­
dently, otherwise they cannot assure that the worst outcome will be avoided. 
Figure 4 presents a case of divergent interest, the aviation situation where 
international carriers from two different countries wish to land at each other's air­
ports. 
What language will be used to communicate to ensure safe landings and 
prevent midair collisions? Each carrier most prefers its own language but it has a 
common interest in avoiding a particular outcome (pilots and controllers not speak­
ing the same language). The dilemma is the likelihood that they might find them­
selves in that situation without prior coordination. In the Sherif et al. (1961) study, 
coordination problems were shown to be solved by superordinate goals, the two 
groups arrived at a norm of taking turns. 
A 
Actor A (English) 
A 
Figure 4. Dilemma of common aversion with divergent interests preference 
structure for communication of international airlines 
Actor B (French) 
B B 
1 1 3  4  
English French French French 





CHAPTER IV. MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
The basic idea from the work of Sherif (1966) presented in the Theory section, 
was that actors who share a common superordinate condition of threatened harm 
or loss, are willing to subordinate their own immediate individual goals with respect 
to the problem, to ensure that the more important group goal of dealing with the 
superordinate problem is attained, they will recognize their interdependence in 
solving the problem and they will be moved by the severity of the threat to form 
a group with a goal oriented toward meeting the challenge posed by the superor­
dinate condition. 
The voluntary group will organize a structure with a set of common rules for 
individual actor behavior. These norms, or rules of behavior, would be designed to 
regulate how actors deal with each other in so far as the group's superordinate 
goal is concerned. 
Based on these concepts, a model of superordinate goal induced intergroup 
cooperation in the absence of a global sovereign is presented in Figure 5. The 
model presents the communication and interaction paths for two international actors 
whose use of a common resource leads to some form of conflict. The model 
suggests that a superordinate condition may be generated when some categories of 
resources are so utilized by the actors, that the future availability of the resource 
becomes threatened. The threat to the availability of the resource is translated into 
a mutual threat to the actors, one that is so critical or compelling, that it cannot 
be ignored and requires both actors to cooperate to insure the future availability of 
the resource. At this point, Sherif's (1966) ideas are employed to show how actors 
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regulate their behavior with respect to the superordinate goal of ensuring the 
















































Figure 5. Model of intergroup cooperation in the absence of an 
international sovereign 
This model could be applied to many actors or only two and the resource in 
question could be described as a public good (a collective good) representative of 
commons dilemmas found in environmental resource issues, political and military 
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issues and economic issues. 
For example, consider the resource to be the atmosphere which two actors 
bordering each other use for the dumping of exhaust gases from coal fired electric 
generating plants. Both actors are aware that the other uses the atmosphere as a 
free resource for dumping waste. As time passes, the actors add more coal fired 
power plants and so dump more waste into the atmosphere until pollution becomes 
a problem in terms of acid rain which reduces drop yields, destroys lakes and fish 
resources, forests and other widespread damage to both countries. At this point 
both actors are aware of a threat to the availability of the resource, an atmosphere 
free of acid rain and other pollutants, and they are aware that reducing the threat 
requires both actors to cooperate. At this point both actors may continue to pollute 
until the threat becomes so compelling that actors reevaluate the resource future 
use value. That is, its future value is no longer discounted relative to its present 
value and actors recognize the likelihood of continued joint use of the resource. 
This sets up the superordinate condition which moves the actors to join together to 
ensure provision of the resource. Thus a new group of two negotiate to specify 
norms needed to attain the goal. The norms could take the form of a convention 
or treaty or other agreement. 
Woildng Model 
The model presented in Figure 5 could also be used to explain cooperation in 
national security issues such as the partial nuclear test ban treaty or political issues 
as the law of the sea and also economic areas such as the General Agreements on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
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In order to test the model presented in Figure 5 using various international 
cases, it must be made more manageable in terms of converting its various concepts 
into measurable independent and dependent variables. Therefore, in this study the 
focus will be on the following concepts: the superordinate condition, the characteris­
tics of state actors, the degree of norm development and norm strength and group 
structure features. This is not to suggest that the remaining concepts of actor 
awareness, discounting of the resource future use value and recognition of future 
interactions are not important. Rather, it is believed that a more fundamental 
understanding of the relationship between various superordinate conditions, state 
actors and the outcomes in terms of norms and group properties observed, would 
provide a firm basis for insight into norm governed cooperation at the international 
level and a simple model from which further development and research can take 
place. 
Based on Figure 5, a simplified model of superordinate condition induced in-
tergroup cooperation is presented in Figure 6. 
Concepts 
The model in Figure 6 suggests that a relationship exists between state actors 
in the presence of superordinate conditions and the development of norms, norm 
strength and group structural features. These concepts are examined in the follow­
ing sections. 
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Figure 6. Model of superordinate condition induced intergroup cooperation 
at the international level 
Snpemrflinate Conditions 
These are conditions which embody goals that all actors find compelling (they 
cannot be ignored) and their attainment is beyond the resources of any one actor 
(Sherif, 1966:88). The first criterion for a situation to become a superordinate 
condition is that the condition must be of sufficient importance for all actors in 
question, such that they would willingly subordinate other sovereign goals in order 
to attain the more compelling goal generated by the superordinate condition. The 
second condition is functional interdependence, that is, solutions to the superordin­
ate condition can only be attained by cooperation of all the actors involved. 
Therefore, at the international level, the superordinate conditions that actors 
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face could be viewed as a "tragedy of the commons", a problem of provision of a 
collective good. Here the threatening condition actors encounter is the loss of the 
resource that each would suffer if they continue to act only in their own narrow self 
interest. 
For example, each actor wishes to increase its harvest of fish from the com­
mon ocean fishing areas, so as each actor continues to take more fish, the total 
catch for all actors begins to decline due to overfishing. This condition of decline 
continues until it is viewed by all the actors as a common "threatening condition", 
one which can only be solved by the cooperation of all actors. In this case cooper­
ation would take the form of a goal of joint restraint by all fishing actors. 
The goal would be realized by the voluntary formation of a group (convention, 
agreement or treaty) among the "threatened actors" and the establishment of guide­
lines for group behavior with respect to the group goal, that of maintenance of the 
fish resource. 
A critical part of the superordinate condition is that the threat produced by it 
must be viewed as so compelling, that it cannot be ignored, and actors are willing 
to give up their sovereignty of individual action with respect to the resource in 
order to respond to the need to eliminate the threatening condition. 
The concept of superordinate conditions can also be found at the international 
level in coordination problems among actors (Stein, 1982). For the case of coor­
dination problems, the level of threat produced by the superordinate condition is 
less than in other types of public goods. Here, the "good" provided by coordination 
is reduced costs for actors. For example, the many conventions that establish inter­
national standards and allow actors to reach lower transaction costs, as in the coor­
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dination in use of radio frequencies which allows actors to use the radio spectrum 
for communications, or international safety standards in design of nuclear power 
plants, which allows neighboring actors the "good" of minimal risk to their popula­
tions from a nuclear accident. Other example are the international conventions that 
quarantine plants and animals in their transportation across borders. This "good" 
protects actors from the spread of disease which could harm local resources. 
States as Actors 
In attempting to demonstrate that norms emerge among states as they interact 
in pursuit of collective goals, it is necessary to view the state as an actor within a 
set of states who face a common superordinate condition. 
Norm Development 
When there is no central authority to impose order (rules of behavior), groups 
form around common interests. Additionally, groups regulate their behavior and 
perpetuate their structure as it relates to their common interest by development of 
status positions and role expectations (Sherif, 1966:12). 
In the context of this study, states as actors form groups and develop coopera­
tive norms to regulate the groups behavior in response to their common superor­
dinate condition. Here the group is understood to be the set of states influenced 
by the superordinate condition. 
A working definition for norms is borrowed from Sherif (1966:12). Norms are 
the expected modes of behavior which define for group members the bounds of 
acceptable behavior. The behaviors defined by norms relate to the goals members 
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share in common. They concern the existence and continued function of the group 
itself. They regulate the reciprocal expectations of members in the functioning of 
organizational patterns. 
Because of the extreme nature of the superordinate condition, states would 
generally be compelled to formalize cooperative norms in order to assure that the 
threat posed by the superordinate condition is eliminated. These norms are called 
formal norms, which consist of treaties and conventions. 
In some cases, cooperative norms may develop in the absence of formal writ­
ten conventions or treaties. These are called informal norms of cooperation and 
consist of public statements and attendance at international meetings. Both are 
focused toward cooperation to eliminate the superordinate threat. 
Norm Strength 
The concept of norm strength assumes that as the categories and intensities of 
threat of the superordinate conditions vary, the degree of cooperation needed to 
eliminate the group threat will also vary. Thus the more important the category 
and the greater the intensity of threat, the greater the degree of sovereignty actors 
will give up to attain the group goal. This is reflected in the degree of monitoring, 
dispute resolution capability and sanctioning. Additionally, variation in category 
and intensity of threat are also reflected in the group structural features of a per­
manent commission or an assignment to an existing group. 
In a similar maimer variations in the strength of informal cooperative norms 
are reflected in cooperative public statements, and meetings attended by actors that 
focus on cooperation to eliminate the group threat. 
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Hypotheses 
These relationships can be expressed as general hypotheses as follows: 
H.l For a set of states interacting in the absence of a sovereign, a superordin­
ate condition promotes the development of norms between members of the set 
(the group), oriented toward the group goal. 
H.2 For a set of states interacting in the absence of a sovereign, the greater 
the threat posed by the superordinate 
condition, the more likely formal norm development. 
H,3 For a set of states interacting in the absence of a sovereign, the greater 
the threat posed by the superordinate condition, the greater the degree of norm 
strength development. 
H.4 For a set of states interacting in the absence of a sovereign and in the 
presence of a superordinate condition, the greater the power difference among 
actors, the less likely formal norm development. 
H.5 For a set of states interacting in the absence of a sovereign and in the 
presence of a superordinate condition, the greater the power difference among 
actors, the less the degree of norm strength development. 
H.6 For a set of states interacting in the absence of a sovereign and in the 
presence of a superordiante condition, the greater the number of actors, the less 
likely norm development. 
H.7 For a set of states interacting in the absence of a sovereign and in the 
presence of a superordinate condition, the smaller the number of actors, the great­
er the degree of norm strength development. 
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CHAPTER V. RESEARCH METHOD 
A variety of data sets are available that contain records of cases of state 
interaction over various periods of time and for categories of issue areas such as 
military conflicts, security, economics and so on. However, none of these data sets 
list cases of states interacting under superordinate conditions! Therefore it is 
necessary to generate a data set from which cases can be analyzed and hypotheses 
tested. 
Because not all cases of state interaction occur under superordinate conditions, 
a selection process relying on a random sampling method would be inadequate, in 
that it would not provide assurance that cases selected would meet the superor­
dinate condition criteria. To overcome this problem, a balance of cases will be 
utilized consisting of three sets. One set includes cases of states interacting under 
superordinate conditions where norms of cooperation emerged as conventions or 
treaties among actors. The second set comprises cases of states interacting under 
superordinate conditions which also resulted in norms of cooperation as a 
convention or treaty, but where some actors later withdrew and the norm of 
cooperation to secure the desired goal was lost. A third set consists of cases of 
states interacting under superordinate conditions but which have not resulted in 
norms of cooperation. 
To simplify the diversity of cases, the superordinate conditions are classified 
into three categories of issue areas, environmental/natural resource, political/milit­
ary, and economic. In selecting cases for each category, an effort was made to 
ensure representation of a mix of cases with only two actors and many actors, and 
with powerful actors and less powerful actors. 
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Although a model and hypotheses have been developed, it should be noted 
that because this effort is an exploratory study, the samll number of cases employed 
does not permit the use of various statistical methods to provide a strong test of the 
hypotheses. However, the model and results will provide a starting point for future 
research efforts that involve a large number of cases. 
Data Sources and Collection Procedures 
The procedure used for the selection of cases was to draw up from the three 
category areas of environmental, economic and political/military issues, a list of 
historic and contemporary cases of commons dilemmas (public goods provision 
problems) where it appeared that each case might meet the criteria of a superor-
dinate condition. Recall that a superordinate condition is one which cannot be 
ignored (actors focus on the superordinate condition over pursuit of sovereign 
interests) and it can only be solved by the cooperation of all the actors involved. 
The history of the cases were then reviewed in detail to determine if they did 
in fact meet the superordinate condition criteria and to ascertain the outcome for 
the actors involved. 
When a case was found to meet the superordinate condition criteria, then a 
brief history of the events supporting the criteria was recorded so the case could 
be placed into a classification scheme of category issue areas (environment, 
economic and political/military), level of threat posed by the superordinate condition 
and the resulting outcome (see Tables 1, 2 and 3 in the Results and Discussion 
Section). 
For each issue area, several variables were then recorded, including the level 
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of threat of the superordinate condition, the number of actors, the power level of 
the actors (who sign or do not sign), the outcome results, including convention, 
bilateral treaty, agreement, no resolution, or a cooperative agreement which later 
fails. In addition, a number of parameters describing the nature of the agreement 
were also recorded, such as the degree of monitoring intrusion, the dispute 
resolution capability, the sanction authority over the actors, formation of a 
permanent commission, and assignment to an existing group. 
A number of data sources were employed to generate a list of possible cases 
as commons dilemmas and also to provide a detailed history of the development 
of superordinate condition and the outcome. The sources include Keesing's 
Contemporary Archives, the Yearbook of International Organizations, Facts on 
File Yearbook, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, International Legal Materials, 
The New York Times Index, The Encyclopedia of the UN and International 
Agreements, World Military and Social Expenditures and the Stockholm Internation­
al Peace Research Institute Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament. 
Operationalization of Variables 
Because some of the concepts are abstract and cannot easily be directly 
observed, it is necessary to find concrete units that are more readily observed and 
are also indicators of the desired concepts. 
In this study, the superordinate condition will be represented by the indepen­
dent variable, threat intensity. The state actors will be represented by two 
independent variables, power level of actor and number of actors. 
For norm development, the dependent variables of formal norms and informal 
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norms will be utilized. Norm strength will be represented by the seven dependent 
variables, degree of monitoring intrusion, degree of sanction authority, dispute 
resolution capability, permanent commission, assignment to a existing group, 
meetings attended and cooperative or noncooperative statements. 
The working model from Figure 6 presented three independent variables 
(intensity of threat, number of actors and level of power) and nine dependent 
variables (formal norm, informal norm, degree monitoring intrusion, dispute 
resolution capability, degree sanction authority, permanent commission, assignment 
to an existing group, meetings attended and cooperative or noncooperative 
statements). 
The superordinate condition in each of the three categories is operationalized 
as a collective threat. In this sense, the "threat" may be viewed as a collective loss 
where all actors are worse off if cooperation is not achieved. 
The concept superordinate condition is measured by the independent variable, 
intensity of threat. INTENSITY OF THREAT is operationalized^ using a three 
point ordinal scale: (1) Crisis level, defined as. A) a level of threat which has 
resulted in the loss of 1000 or more lives and or the loss of $50 billion or more 
from economic or environmental impact, B) a level which demands a response of 
altered behavior within 24 weeks or the situation will continue to impose costs as 
stated in (A), and C) a threat condition that appears as a surprise to the actors; 
(2) Urgent level, defined as. A) a level of threat which has resulted in the loss of 
more than 100 but less than 1000 lives and or a loss of between $50 million and $50 
^Operational measures for the threat level are borrowed from definitions 
developed by Hermann (1969) and McCormick (1978:352-358). 
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billion from economic or environmental impact, B) a level which demands a 
response of altered behavior within 24 months or the situation will continue to 
impose costs as stated in (A), and C) a threat condition that appears as a surprise; 
(3) Compelling level, defined as, A) a level of threat which has resulted in sickness 
of 10,000 or loss of less than 100 lives and or a loss of less than $50 million firom 
economic or environmental impact, B) a level which demands a response of altered 
behavior within 3 years or the situation will continue to impose costs as stated in 
(A), and C) a threat that does not appear as a surprise. 
The concept of state actor in the model is measured by two independent 
variables, level of power and number of actors in the set. The LEVEL OF POWER 
of the state actor is operationalized using GNP per capita in a three point ordinal 
scale; (1) High, the highly industrialized countries with a GNP per capita of $6000 
or more in 1987; (2) Middle those developing countries with a GNP per person of 
more than $480 but less than $6000 in 1987; and (3) Weak, those developing 
countries with a GNP per capita of $480 or less in 1987 (World Development 
Report 1989). 
The independent variable, NUMBER OF ACTORS, is operationalized by listing 
the set of states which are subject to the threat imposed by the superordinate 
condition. 
The concept of norm development is measured by two dependent variables: 
formal and informal. The dependent variable FORMAL norm development is 
operationalized using the categories: (1) Convention (this is also used to represent 
multilateral treaties), (2) Agreement, (3) Bilateral treaty, and (4) Breakdown. 
The dependent variable INFORMAL norm development is operationalized 
42 
using the categories: (1) Statements recorded as either cooperative or not 
cooperative, (2) Meetings attended, recorded as yes or no, and (3) No resolution, 
the problem was not resolved. 
The concept norm strength is measured by five dependent variables: degree 
of monitoring intrusion, dispute resolution capability, degree of sanction authority, 
permanent commission, and assign to an existing group. The DEGREE MONITOR­
ING OF INTRUSION is operationalized using a three point ordinal scale: (1) High 
intrusion, where the host state allows inspectors from a regulatory board or from 
another state in the set to monitor and record activities. The monitoring may be 
on request of a member of the set or may be permanent. For example, arms 
control inspectors who have access to specific weapons production plants, or 
inspectors who are stationed on fishing vessels to monitor catch resources; (2) 
Medium Intrusion, where the state accepts placement of electronic or mechanical 
devices to monitor compliance. Consider the example of electronic transponders 
placed on fishing vessels, which allows them to be continuously monitored by 
satellite, or the mechanical/electrical meters used to count production of licensed 
products; (3) Low intrusion, where the state or actor provides self reported 
standardized data, as in the reporting of discharges into the Rhine River. 
The DISPUTE RESOLUTION CAPABILITY is operationalized using a three 
point ordinal scale: (1) High capability, where actors submit to the decisions and 
authority of a permanent regulatory commission set up by the convention or treaty; 
(2) Medium capability, where actors submit to the international court or binding 
arbitration; and (3) Low capability, where no specific procedures to settle 
disagreements are spelled out, except that actors seek and agree on a settlement 
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method. 
The DEGREE OF SANCTION AUTHORTIY is operationalized using a three 
point ordinal scale: (1) High authority, where actors agree to submit to the 
authority of each other's courts; (2) Low Authority, where a permanent regulatory 
commission imposes sanctions, such as fines; and (3) No authority, where actors do 
not agree to any specified sanctions for noncompliance. 
To simplify the data analysis, norm strength variables; the degree of monitoring 
intrusion, dispute resolution capability, and the degree of sanction authority are 
collapsed into a single measure to represent the DEGREE OF NORM STRENGTH 
DEVELOPMENT. For each case this measure is derived from data in Tables 4, 5, 
and 6, and is recorded as the highest observation from any one of the above noted 
norm strength variables. The Degree of Norm Strength Development is presented 
in Chapter VIII. Discussion of Results. 
The remaining two variables, permanent commission and assign to an existing 
group, are employed as general characteristics of norm strength associated with 
administrative capacity and are discussed in Chapter VII. 
The dependent variable, PERMANENT COMMISSION is operationalized by 
using the categories: Ifes or No as to the existence of a permanent commission 
set up by the actors to manage their attainment of the group's superordinate goal. 
The dependent variable. Assign to an existing group is operationalized using a yes 
or no category indicating that the function of the group has been assigned to an 
existing group, for example a convention is signed by actors to control ozone 
damaging gases and responsibility is assigned to the U.N. Environmental Program. 
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CHAPTER VL DATA 
Snperordinate Conditions and Ontcomes. 
A total of 26 cases are presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3. A brief background 
history is given for each superordinate condition considered, along with the level of 
threat posed by the condition and the outcome. Table 1 covers 12 cases of 
environmental superordinate conditions and their outcomes: The radioactive fallout 
threat from the Chernobyl nuclear accident, the fallout threat from atmospheric 
testing of nuclear weapons in the 1950s and 1960s, the pollution threat to the 
Mediterranean Sea, the early and accelerating threat from chloroflorocarbons to the 
ozone (3 cases), the acid rain threat, the threat to marine life from drift nets, the 
carbon dioxide greenhouse gas threat to the climate, the threat posed by toxic waste 
dumping and the ecological threat posed by the loss of tropical forests. 
Table 1. Environmental superordinate conditions and outcomes® 
Superordinate Condition 
1. Crisis: April 26 to mid May 1986, an 
explosion and fire at the Chernobyl 
nuclear power station sends radioactive 
fallout over Europe. 
Outcome 
September 24-26,1986, a special session 
of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency adopts two conventions; one 
required notification of accidents, the 
other required aid to any country af­
fected by a nuclear accident. 
2. Compelling: April 1957, Japan com­
plains of atmospheric contamination 
from nuclear tests. Scientists warn that 
children in the U.S. and Canada have 
already received the maximum level of 
cancer producing radiation from fallout. 
October 1985, nuclear weapon states 
begin negotiations to ban nuclear weap­
ons testing. 
"References for each case are provided in Appendix A. 
Table 1. (continued) 
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Superordinate Condition 
3. Urgent: April-August 1962, scientists 
warn that continued nuclear weapons 
testing may require removal of milk from 
the diet of children, to prevent cancer. 
On August 23, 1962, Minn, begins a 
program to withdraw dairy cows from 
pasture to reduce radioactive iodine in 
milk. Major reports noted of increased 
radioactive fallout in the U.S. food 
supply. 
4.Urgent: May 1974, an intergovernmen­
tal consultation held by request of the 
General Fisheries Council for the Medit­
erranean sets guidelines to protect the 
Mediterranean Sea from pollution. 
5. Compelling: A 1976 National Acade­
my of Science report warns that chloro-
florocarbons (CFCs) could deplete the 
ozone and allow dangerous levels of 
ultraviolet light. In march 1982, scien­
tists report a 1% drop in ozone could 
result in a 10% increase in skin cancer. 
6. Urgent: October 20, 1986, a report 
notes a sharp drop in ozone over the 
antarctic. 
7. Urgent: In November 1988, the Euro­
pean Community Commission on the En­
vironment, called the elimination of 
CFCs due to the accumulating evidence 
of the threat to the ozone. 
Outcome 
August 5, 1963, the Test Ban Treaty is 
signed, it bans nuclear weapons tests in 
the atmosphere and under water. 
February 16,1976, a Convention and two 
protocols are signed to control pollution 
in the Mediterranean Sea. 
In March 1985, a convention to protect 
the ozone is signed. The convention 
caUed on states to cooperate in taking 
steps to prevent damage to the ozone, 
but no obligations to reduce CFC pro­
duction were specified. 
September 16, 1987, a protocol to the 
1985 Ozone convention is signed. It 
would freeze CFC production by 1990 at 
the 1986 levels, and reduce production 
by 50% by 1999. 
March 2, 1989, 12 members of the 
European Community agree to ban all 
CFC production by the year 2000. The 
agreement is nonbinding 
Table 1. (continued) 
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Superordinate Condition 
8. Urgent: October 1984, West German 
government studies blame acid rain for 
damaging or killing over half of their 
forests. 
9. Compelling: Scientists claim that drift 
net fishing is depleting species in the 
Pacific Ocean. The U.S. called for a 
total ban on drift nets by 1992. 
10. Urgent: June 1988, some 300 scien­
tists and policy makers from 48 nations 
agreed in Toronto, that greenhouse gases 
would warm the atmosphere by 1.5-4.5 
degrees C in the next 60 years. The 
result would be severe climate change in­
cluding a 1.5M rise in sea level, more 
rain in the tropics and less rain in tem­
perate regions. 
11. Compelling: November 1988, green-
peace reported 3,700,000 tons of wastes 
of all types were shipped from North to 
South in 1986-88. The discovery of open 
dump sites in Africa and other develop­
ing countries aroused public health 
concerns. 
12. Compelling: By 1988, tropical forests 
were being cleared at a rate of 11,500,-
000 ha/yr. This accelerates the green­
house effect, soil erosion, loss of genetic 
resources and destroys the livelihood of 
indigenous populations. 
Outcome 
July 9, 1985, a protocol to the Conven­
tion on Long Range Transboundary Air 
Pollution is signed. Sulfur emissions 
are to be reduced by 30% by 1993 based 
on the 1980 levels. 
The U.S., Japan, S. Korea, and Taiwan 
negotiate bilateral treaties to control drift 
net fishing. The Asian states oppose a 
convention to ban drift nets. 
No convention. The Toronto conference 
called for the U.N. to draw up a conven­
tion to protect the atmosphere, including 
a 20% cut in fossil fuel use by the year 
2005, and a goal of a 50% reduction to 
stabilize the carbon dioxide level in the 
atmosphere. In May 1989, the 15th U.N. 
Environmental Program session agreed 
to begin negotiations on a global climate 
convention in 1990. 
No resolution. March 20, 1989, a treaty 
is signed by 34 countries to regulate 
transboundary shipment of hazardous 
waste. None of the major producers, nor 
the third world destination countries 
signed. 
No convention. Tensions between the 
industrialized and developing countries 
increase over use of the rain forests. 
Brazil denounced foreign pressure to 
save the forests as ecological imperial­
ism. 
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Table 2 presents the economic superordinate conditions and outcomes, and 
includes 7 cases dealing with the following problem areas: the threat to public safety 
from lack of aviation standards, disputes among international air carriers over 
control of routes threatens access to the international routes, radio communication 
interference threat posed by uncontrolled use of the radio spectrum, the threat to 
global economic development posed by tariff barriers, the threat to world economic 
stability due to third world debt, first world mineral recovery firom the oceans 
continental shelves threatens the principle of the common heritage of ocean 
resources, and threats to oil producer sovereignty over oil resources. 
Table 2. Economic superordinate conditions and outcomes'* 
Superordinate Condition 
1. Compelling: In 1918, regular flights 
between Europe and its colonies, and 
North America, prompt a need for 
standard rules for aircraft, pilots, and 
navigation. 
2. Compelling: August 1944, disputes 
between U.S., British and Dutch air 
carriers over access to air routes, brings 
a call for an international conference on 
civil aviation. 
3. Compelling: By 1930, International 
radio broadcasts were conunon. Grow­
ing power of transmitters threatened in­
terference in use of the radio spectrum. 
4. Compelling: In the 1930s, as nations 
experienced economic depression, tariffs 
Outcome 
September 1919, the Convention Regula­
ting Aerial Navigation, to insure airwor­
thiness and flight standards. 
December 1944, the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation is signed. It 
establishes routes, technical safety stan­
dards. 
December 7, 1932, the International 
Telecommunications Convention is 
signed, to coordinate use of the radio 
spectrum. 
January 1,1948, the General Agreements 
on Tariffs and Trade are signed to 




were erected to protect domestic in­
dustries. As WW II was ending, national 
leaders feared tariffs would remain, en­
dangering fair exchange of goods, reduc­
ing the standard of living and slowing 
development. 
5. Urgent: The World Bank reported in 
1987, that third world debt was $1.19 
trillion. No country in the last 5 years 
has significantly reduced its debt despite 
annual payments totally $30 billion. 
Recent austerity to meet interest pay­
ments have resulted in higher consumer 
prices for basic goods, and riots in Febr­
uary 1989, which left 300 dead in Venez­
uela. 
6. Compelling: In 1977, new technology 
permitted the industrialized countries to 
drill and mine the ocean flood. The less 
developed nations view control of sea 
bed resources by the industrialized 
nations as a threat to their economic 
survival. 
7. Urgent: February 1959, major oil 
companies reduce their prices without 
consulting the producing countries. In 
August 1960, oil prices were again lower­
ed without consulting the producers. 
These actions were viewed as a threat to 
the sovereign control of the oil by the 
producing countries. 
Outcome 
eliminate discrimination in trade, and to 
aid national development. A total of 23 
states negotiated the treaty. 
No resolution. In July 1989, after warn­
ings that many highly indebted countries 
could no longer meet their interest 
payments, the major lenders began 
negotiations on debt reduction and 
rescheduling of interest payments. 
April 1982, a vote to form a seabed 
authority within a new Law of the Sea 
Treaty causes division between first and 
third world nations. Several industrial­
ized nations voted against the Law os 
the Sea Treaty. The convention was 
signed by 117 states. 
In September 1960, representatives of 
Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and 
Venezuela, met in Baghdad and formed 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), to establish a com­
mon price policy. 
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Table 3 presents the political and military superordinate conditions and 
outcomes, and includes 7 cases dealing with the following problem areas: the threat 
to nuclear deterrence from an operational anti-ballistic missile system, the threat 
to nuclear deterrence from advancing missile technology, the hijacking threat to air 
safety, the threat of war and instability from third world development of ballistic 
missile capability, the threat of continued deaths and economic destruction from the 
Iran Iraq war, the threat of continued deaths and economic destruction from the 
Israel Palestine conflict, and the threat of war and the economic threat from an 
accelerating arms race between Pakistan and India, (the Iran Iraq war, Israel Pales­
tine conflict and Pakistan India arms race are included to provide two actor cases 
with low power level actors and actors with large power differences). 
Table 3. Political and military superordinate conditions and outcomes 
Superordinate Condition 
1. Crisis: In 1967, an operational Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) system destabil­
izes deterrence. 
2. Crisis: Advancing missile technology 
in multiple independently targeted reen­
try vehicles (MIRVs), combined with 
high accuracy guidance and small war­
heads, destabilize deterrence. 
3. Compelling: In 1970, at least 40 hi­
jackings or attempts to hijack aircraft 
were made worldwide. The destruction 
of aircraft cost $240 million. 
Outcome 
In 1969, ABM talks begin, and on May 
26, 1972 the U.S. and U.S.S.R. sign a 
treaty. 
On June 15,1979, the SALT II treaty is 
signed. It will limit the numbers of 
nuclear missiles. 
On December 16,1970, the Convention 
on Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft was 
signed. It required nations to prosecute 
hijackers. 
Table 3. (continued) 
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Superordinate Condition Outcome 
4. Urgent: By 1988, at least 20 third 
world nations possessed ballistic missiles 
or were developing the technology to 
produce them. 
5. Crisis: By 1988, the Iran Iraq war had 
escalated to the level of missile attacks 
on each other's capitals, and use of 
chemical weapons. The cost of the war 
reached 100,000 civilian deaths and 
900,000 military deaths. The economic 
cost was estimated to be $400 billion, 
negotiations (1980-88). 
6. Urgent: By June 15, 1989, the 18 
month intifada conflict between the 
Palestinians and Israelis, had resulted in 
the death of 715 Palestinians and 45 
Israelis, plus thousands of wounded. 
7. Urgent: Since 1947, several wars and 
border conflicts have occurred between 
India and Pakistan. A conventional and 
nuclear arms race resulted. In 1988, it 
was estimated that India spent $300 
million on ballistic missile development 
over the past few years, and Pakistan 
spent over $100 million over a similar 
period. 
No convention, however, 7 first world 
nations agreed to a multilateral regime 
to restrict the export of missile technol­
ogy, on April 16, 1987. 
In August 1988, the Iran Iraq war ended 
with a U.N. mediated cease fire, and 
negotiations (1980-88). 
No resolution, however, informal com­
munications and meetings are reported. 
No resolution, however, tensions eased 
after the election of Benazir Bhutto in 
Pakistan. 
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CHAPTER Vn. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
The results for the superordinate cases covering the three categories of 
environmental, economic, and political and military issues, are presented along with 
their dependent variable outcomes in Tables 4, 5 and 6, respectively. 
The findings and their impact on the hypotheses are first discussed for all 26 
cases combined. The cases are then examined by category area. 
The relationship between the superordinate condition and norm development 
for all 26 cases is presented in Figure 7. A crosstabulation of the relationship is 
provided in Appendix E and indicates moderately strong support for hypothesis H.l 
as reflected in the .52 value for Cramer's V. Here, Cramer's V measures 
association of discrete variables based on Chi-square, and ranges from 0 to +1, with 
0 being no relationship and +1 being a strong positive relationship. Thus .52 
indicates a moderately strong relationship between the independent variable 
superordinate condition, and the dependent variable norm development. 
Hypothesis H.2 also appears to be moderately supported by Figure 7 and by 
the Somer's D value of .44 in Appendix E. The .44 value- indicates moderately 
strong support for the claim that higher levels of threat firom the superordinate 
condition will result in formal norm development. 
Somer's D is an asymmetric measure of association for two orderable variables, 
and has a range of -1 to +1, with +1 being a strong positive relationship. 
The influence of various superordinate condition threat levels on the degree 
of norm strength development can be seen in Figure 8. For this relationship, the 
crosstabulation in Appendix E yields a value of .16 for Somer's D. This indicates 
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Figure 7. Relationship between superordinate condition and norm development 
for all cases 
condition increases, the degree of norm strength development also increases. It 
would be expected that higher levels of threat would produce a greater degree of 
norm strength development, but this does not appear to be strongly supported by 
this limited data set. This result maybe due to the small number of cases employed 
and also because the norm strength variables of low and medium were combined 
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into one measure (low), to reduce the number of empty cells in the calculation of 
Somer's D. Thus, for all 26 cases, it appears that hypothesis H.3 is only weakly 
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Figure 8. Influence of superordinate condition on the degree of norm strength 
development for all cases 
The influence of actor power difference on norm development is presented in 
Figure 9, and in Appendix E, as indicated by the .25 Somer's D value. This 
indicates only a weak influence from actor power difference on norm development. 
Therefore, the claim made by hypothesis H.4, that a greater actor power difference 
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Figure 9. Influence of actor power difference on norm development for all cases 
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Only weak support was found for hypothesis H.5 in its claim that a greater 
actor power difference would reduce the degree of norm strength development. 
This can be seen in Figure 10 below and its supporting Somer's D value of .15 in 
Appendix E. 
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Figure 10. Influence of actor power difference on the degree of norm strength 
development for all cases 
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The number of actors was found to have no influence on norm development. 
This is confirmed in Figure 11 and also in its supporting statistic of a ,04 Phi value 
in Appendix E. Phi is used in place of Cramer's V for 2x2 cells. Thus, the claim 
made in hypothesis H.6 that a large number of actors would reduce the likelihood 
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Figure 11. Influence of the number of actors on norm development for all cases 
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When formal norms do develop, it was found that a small number of actors 
may have a weak influence on the degree of norm strength development. This 
finding is presented in Figure 12 below and in the supporting Somer's D value of 
.25 in Appendix E. This offers weak support for hypothesis H.7, that is, the smaller 
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Figure 12. Influence of the number of actors on the degree of norm strength 
development for all areas 
The category areas will now each be examined as a separate group to clarify 
the strength of relationships which were less clear when all cases were combined. 
For the 12 environmental cases, it can be seen from Table 4 and Figure 13, 
that as the threat intensity of the superordinate condition reaches the urgent or 
crisis level, then the resulting norms are formal conventions. When the threat is 
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Figure 13. Relationship between the threat level of the superordinate condition 
and norm development for the environmental cases 
Table 4. Results for environmental superordinate cases 
cases 
Concept Variables cases> 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 ' Chernobyl 
SuperordinateThreat Crisis * 
Condition intensity Uraent * • * * * * * ^Fallout 
Compellina * * * * * 1957 
State actor Number of Actors 32 3 3 18 52 52 49 27 5 48 38 24 
Power # sianed 32 3 15 20 33 21 4 15 ^Fallout 
level Hiah 13 2 4 12 21 14 2 5 1962 
(signed) Middle 17 1 11 8 12 7 2 8 
Low 2 0 10 2 ^Mediterra­
Power # not sian 3 3 32 9 6 1 3 24 nean Sea 
level hiah 2 9 4 1 3 9 pollution 
(not sign) middle 1 3 10 6 2 
low 13 3 14 11 ^Ozone 
Norm Formal Convention * * * * * * * CFC 1985 
Development Aareement 
Bilateral * 'ozone 
Breakdown CFC 1986 
No resolution * * * * * * * 
Informal Statements c c c n c n n ^Ozone 
Meetings * * * * * * * CFC 1989 
Norm Degree of Hiah * 
Strength monitorina Medium ®Acid 
intrusion Low * * * * * rain 1984 
Dispute Hiah 
resolution Medium * * * 'Drift 
caoabilitv Low * * * nets 
Degree of Hiah 
sanction Medium ^"Atmosphere 
warming authoritv Low * * * * * * 
Permanent Yas 
Commission No * * * * * * '^Hazardous 
To existinaYes * * * * waste 
arouD No * * Rainforest 
Key; * = variable present, C = cooperative, N = noncooperative 
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Moderately strong support for hypothesis H.2 by the environmental cases can 
be seen in the .65 Somer's D value from the crosstabulation of superordinate 
condition by norm development in Appendix E. 
Five environmental cases appear to deviate from H.2 and warrant a brief 
discussion. 
Case 5 (ozone 1985) is the first of three CFC-ozone cases examined. The 
threat level for this case is recorded as compelling and the norm outcome is 
recorded as both convention and no resolution. A convention to protect the ozone 
layer was signed in March of 1985, but a protocol which would specify obligations 
for the states was not agreed to. Therefore, this result is the same as no 
convention, and thus does support H.2, in that the compelling level resulted in 
meetings and cooperative statements. The convention expressed the intent of states 
to collect and exchange data on the ozone layer, and to work together to develop 
measures to protect it. 
Case 7 (ozone 1989) is the third CFC-ozone case. The level of threat is 
recorded as urgent and norm development is recorded as no resolution, even though 
12 members of the European Community agreed to ban all CFC production by the 
year 2000. Because the agreement was a nonbinding resolution, the outcome was 
recorded as no resolution. 
The lack of a new convention imposing new restrictions on actors may be 
explained, in that some actors in the set may not view the threat as* great enough 
to warrant more a restrictive convention than that agreed to in 1987. If the 
perception of the actors were to change, such that all viewed the threat as a crisis, 
then a more restrictive convention then the 1987 protocol should result. Therefore, 
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this case does appear to support hypothesis H.2. 
Case 9 (drift nets) is the threat to marine life in the Pacific due to use of drift 
nets. The threat intensity is recorded as compelling and the norm development is 
recorded as both no resolution and bilateral treaty, because the treaties negotiated 
between the actors were not uniform in addressing the central issue of the threat, 
that of banning or regulating the use of drift nets. Although the case does not 
suggest a rejection of H.2, it could be assumed based on the trend of the other 
environmental cases, that if the threat were perceived by the actors to be at the 
urgent level, then a convention should result. The model and data suggest that a 
higher level threat would bring a uniform response which is not reached at the 
lower level of perceived threat. 
Case 10 (global warming) is the greenhouse warming threat from the buildup 
of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. The threat intensity is recorded as urgent and 
the norm development is recorded as no resolution, and informal norms of meetings 
and cooperative statements. The lack of a convention in this case might be 
explained in terms of an incorrect assumption as to the costs imposed on states 
from the greenhouse effect. If the assumed costs were selected as higher then 
states actually view the threat, the resulting classification as urgent would incorrectly 
predict a convention. No accurate measure of the costs of the greenhouse effect 
exist, but if a more conservative assumption of costs is made, then the threat level 
would be classified as compelling and in this case the outcome predicted would 
match the measured results of meetings and cooperative statements. This case may 
suggest that the predictive power of the model is sensitive to an accurate measure 
of the threat imposed on the set of actors. 
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Case 11 (hazardous waste) examines the threat of hazardous and toxic waste 
dumping in the third world. The threat intensity is recorded as compelling and 
the norm development is recorded as both formal convention and no resolution, 
and also as informal norms of meetings and noncooperative statements. Although 
a convention resulted in this case, it did not address the central issue of either 
banning or strongly regulating hazardous waste shipments. In addition the major 
actors, both those with high power and those with little power did not support the 
convention, but for opposite reasons. 
An explanation for the failure of actors to achieve an effective convention in 
this case may rest on the possibility that the powerful actors do not perceive the 
hazardous waste issue to be a threat, or at least their perception may be at a lower 
level of threat than that viewed by the third world countries where some of the 
wastes are now shipped. If this perception difference is the case, and the powerful 
actors do not view the threat posed to be at the same level as that of the less 
powerful actors, then the mutual threat criterion which is necessary for a 
superordinate condition to exist, is lost, and the result would then be actors taking 
positions of individual rather than collective interests. 
Figure 14 presents the relationship between the superordinate condition threat 
level and the degree of norm strength development for the environmental cases. 
It can be seen that as the threat intensity increases, conventions are more likely, but 
the degree of norm strength does not appear to increase. Therefore hypothesis H.3 
is not supported by the environmental cases. A Somer's D could not be computed 
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Figure 14. Relationship between the threat level of the superordinate condition 
and the degree of norm strength development for the environmental 
cases 
One exception appears to be the drift net issue (case 9), where, although the 
threat level is low, the norm development outcome is a formal bilateral treaty and 
norm strength is high. This may suggest that greater norm strength development 
is possible when only two actors are involved, but this claim cannot be made on the 
basis of only one case. 
The impact of power differences among states on formal norm development 
is presented in Figure 15. Based on the Somer's D value of .31 for this relation­
ship in Appendix E, the environmental cases appear to give weak support to the 
claim by H.4 that the greater the actor power difference, the less likely formal 
norm development. On the other hand, environmental cases also seem to suggest 
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that for crisis or urgent levels of threat, high power differences do not reduce the 
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Figure 15. Relationship between actor power difference and formal norm 
development for environmental cases 
However, power differences appear to be a factor in reducing the likelihood 
of formal norm development when the threat level of the superordinate condition 
is at the lowest level (compelling). Support for this can be seen in case 9, the drift 
net issue, case 11, the hazardous waste dumping issue, and case 12, the loss of 
tropical forests. In each of these cases the less powerful actors made strong 
noncooperative statements. Also it should be noted that in the drift net case, the 
less powerful actors opposed a convention to ban or regulate drift net use, while the 
more powerful actors favored a strong convention. The outcome of this case 
appeared to favor the less powerful actors who were able to negotiate bilateral 
65 
treaties rather than a convention. Additionally, the less powerful actors appeared 
to be favored in the norm strength development. Although it was highly intrusive 
with observers to be stationed on the fishing vessels, the number of observers 
allowed was very small in comparison to the size of the fleet of fishing vessels. 
The impact of power differences appears to become important only when the 
threat posed by the superordinate condition is at the compelling level, that is, the 
lowest level. When this condition is present, it allows actors to pressure for a 
position of individual advantage, which is not possible when the threat level is high 
and all actors face the same potential or actual harm, or joint gain. 
Actor power difference had no apparent influence on the degree of norm 
development for the environmental or the economic cases. A Somer's D for these 
relationships could not be computed due to the number of empty cells. 
The number of actors had no apparent influence on either norm development 
or on the degree of norm strength for both the environmental and the economic 
cases. Statistics could not be computed for these due to the number of empty cells 
in the crosstabulation matrix. 
The economic cases in Table 5 and Figure 16 were found to give moderate 
support to H.l and H.2 as reflected in a Phi value of .3 and a Somer's D of .3 
respectively from Appendix E. 
In appears that for economic cases, formal norms tend to develop at the lowest 
threat level. Therefore, it is unclear how strongly hypothesis H.2 would be 
supported. Additionally, 6om Figure 17, it is unclear if an increasing economic 
threat would result in a greater degree of norm strength development, therefore, 
economic issues appear not to support hypothesis H.3. 
i Table 5. Results for economic superordinate cases 
Concent Variables cases> 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ^Aviation 
SuperordinateThreat Crisis • standards 
Condition intensity Urgent * * 
Compelling * * * * * ^International 
State actor Number of Actors 5 8 63 23 24 151 5 air routes 
Power # signed 5 63 9 117 5 
level High 5 6 5 13 ^Radio 
(signed) Middle 19 9 55 5 broadcasting 
Low 37 49 
Power # not sign 24 23 ^International 
level high 7 10 trade GATT 
(not sign) middle 15 
low 2 ^Third world 
Norm Formal Convention * * * * debt 
Development Agreement * 
Bilateral * * 'ocean resources 
Breakdown ^ Sea Bed Authority 
No resolution * * Law of the Sea 
Informal Statements n n 
Meetings * * ^Oil prices 
Norm Degree of High * OPEC 
Strength monitoring Medium 
intrusion Low * * * * * 
Dispute High 
resolution Medium * * * * * 
cauabilitv Low * 
Degree of High * 
sanction Medium * 
authority Low * * * * 
Permanent Yes * * * * * * 
Commission No 
To existinaYes 
group No * * * * * * 









Figure 16. The influence of superordinate condition on norm development for 
economic cases 
It may be that actors are more responsive to economic issues in general and 
therefore act quickly to collectively correct most economic threats. One exception 
from the data seems to be case 5, the third world debt issue. The superordinate 
condition was recorded at the urgent level, and the outcome was recorded as both 
bilateral agreement and no resolution. No resolution was recorded because a 
collective solution was not reached. An explanation for the failure to reach a 
collective outcome may be that the powerful actors do not perceive the threat to 











become dominant and actors take positions of narrow self interest over the interest 





Figure 17. Influence of actor power diference on the degree of norm strength 
development for ecomonic cases 
Case 6, the Seabed Authority issue was also recorded as treaty and no 
resolution. In this case, 10 powerful actors did not sign the treaty (Law of the Sea 
Treaty) because of the Seabed Authority issue. Although the actors will likely live 
up to the other aspects of the Law of the Sea Treaty, it was still recorded as no 
resolution. The problem of some actors not signing may be due to their perception 
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Degree norm strength development 
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powerful actors who did not sign, along with the others who did sign the treaty may 
have viewed most of the issues of the treaty to be a compelling threat, but the 
powerful actors did not view the need for a Seabed Authority as a compelling 
threat. Here again it becomes clear that when actors do not perceive the same 
level of threat, the cohesive force to achieve a collective outcome is lost and actors 
focus on narrow self interest over the group interest. 
The support of economic cases for H.4 could not be determined because most 
of the cases employed in the sample had a superordinate condition threat level of 
compelling, see Figure 18. 
High 
Third world debt 
Seabed authority 
Actor Medium 
power Air routes 






Figure 18. Influence of actor power difference on norm developmant for 
economic cases 
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The economic cases also gave moderate support to H.5 as reflected in the .5 
Somer's D from Appendix E. Thus, the smaller the actor power difference, the 
more likely formal norm development. 
Moderate support for H.1, H.2, and H.3 for the political and military cases is 
expressed in the crosstab relationships in Appendix E by the Cramer's V of 1.0, a 
Somer's D of.4, and a Somer's D of .33, respectively, see Figures 19 and 20. Actor 
power difference was observed to have no relationship to formal norm development, 














Figure 19. Influence of superordinate condition on norm development for 
political and military cases 
On the other hand, actor power difference was observed to have moderate 
support for H.5, that is the higher the power difference, the lower the norm 
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Strength development. This was supported by a Somer's D value of .6 although it 
should be cautioned that this result is based on only four cases, so the support 
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Figure 20. Influence of superordinate condition on norm strength development 
for political and military cases 
It can be seen from Table 6, that when the superordinate condition reaches 
the crisis level, it is more likely that a formal convention, treaty or agreement will 
result. One exception to this is case 3, the hijacking issue, which results in a 
convention at the lowest threat level. The difference may be that cases 1,2 and 5 
deal with high level national security or military issues, and therefore the threat 
posed by them may be viewed by actors to be at a higher level. 
It is also of interest to note that cases 6 and 7 (Intifada and the India-Pakistan 
arms race) are at the urgent level, and they do not result in the development of 
Table 6. Results for political and military superordinate cases 
Concept Variables cases> 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Cases 
SuperordinateThreat Crisis * * * 
^Anti-Ballistic Condition intensity Urgent * * * 
• Compelling 1 * Missile (ABM) 
• State actor Number of Actors 2 2 119 27 2 2 2 
« Power # signed 2 2 50 7 2 ^Arms race 
level High 1 1 15 7 SALT II 
1 (signed) Middle 1 1 25 2 j Low 10 ^Airline 
; Power # not sign 20 2 2 hijacking 
level high 1 1 
(not sign) middle 16 1 2 *Third world i low 3 ballistic missile 
j Norm Formal Convention * * race 
1 Development Agreement * 
Bilateral * * ®Iran-Iraq war j Breakdown 
I No resolution * * * 'intifada 
1 
I Informal Statements c c 
Meetings * * ^India-Pakistan 
! Norm Degree of High * arms race 
1 Strength monitoring Medium 
intrusion Low * * * j Dispute Hiah 
resolution Medium * * * * 
i capabilitv Low 
Degree of High 1 
sanction Medium 
M authority Low * * * * 
Permanent Yes * * * 
To existinaYes * 
o-—,--S£2ME-=-=».=JS2==========-=i=i=JLo======ip 
Key: * =variable present, C = copperative, N = noncooperative. 
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Figure 21. Influence of actor power difference on norm development for plitical 
and military cases 
formal norms, but rather informal norms of meetings and cooperative statements. 
Also, case 4, the third world quest for ballistic missiles, was classified as urgent and 
recorded as both convention and no resolution. The basis for the no resolution 
classification was that none of the developing countries who are seeking ballistic 
missile technology signed the convention. The convention was signed only by the 
advanced countries and most of them already possess ballistic missiles. The failure 
to achieve a true convention in this case may be due to the difference in the 
perception of threat posed by the spread of ballistic missiles. The advanced 
powerful nations view the acquisition of ballistic missiles by the third world nation 
as a destabilizing threat to international peace, or perhaps a threat to themselves, 
whereas the third world nations view the missiles as enhancing either their own 
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security or regional peace. Because the actors do not face or at least do not 
perceive a joint threat from the missiles, then the condition for a superordinate 
threat is lost. Therefore a reasonable argument could be made that case 4 (third 
world missile quest) should not be considered as a superordinate condition, and thus 
the model would suggest that no (meaningful) convention would result, which is the 
outcome observed. 
It can be observed that if cases 6 and 7 (Intifada and the India-Pakistan arms 
race) were perceived as crisis and not urgent, then the model would suggest that 
they should result in an agreement. 
It is of interest to note that three of the four cases that resulted in formal 
norms, involved important national security issues, but did not result in high levels 
of norm strength development. It may be that high levels of norm development are 
associated with national security or military issues, where a high level of intrusion 
by observers is required. This can be seen in case 5 with the use of U.N. Peace 
Keeping Observers, and also in the use of on site inspectors, in the recent 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
Only a small degree of norm strength development was found in the cases 1 
and 2, (the ABM treaty and the SALT II treaty). The difference may be due to 
the need for on site inspection in some classes of military or national security issues 
where intrusive monitoring by the actors is the only method of resolving the threat. 
It has been observed in almost all other cases that the threat can be resolved by the 
actors without the use of highly intrusive monitoring. 
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It is also of interest to note that three of the five cases which ended in a formal 
norm outcome of convention or treaty, also involved use of a permanent commis­
sion, and only one case was assigned to an existing group, the Peacekeeping 
Observers of the U.N. in the Iran-Iraq war. 
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CHAPTER Vin. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study has endeavored to explain how voluntary norms of cooperation can 
occur among states interacting in the absence of a central authority. It has 
addressed the central question of why states voluntarily enter into conventions, 
treaties or agreements and comply with them, especially when the result imposes 
some loss of sovereignty on the states involved. 
Traditional perspectives on international relations have generally tended to 
focus on power to explain state interaction in the absence of a sovereign. However 
these models are inadequate for explaining voluntary cooperation. 
This study has applied a unique perspective to the problem of voluntary 
cooperation, one that appears to have been overlooked in most studies of interna­
tional relations. The model employed the approach that norms of cooperation 
could develop among states in the same way that they develop within any group of 
actors! 
This is a highly unusual approach in that it takes well established theories from 
sociology and social psychology that deal with group formation and the emergence 
of cooperative norms, and applies them to the international level. Thus states 
become the actors in a group and they evolve norms to regulate their behavior. 
One additional unique aspect of the study was that is employed superordinate 
goal theory developed by Sherif et al. (1961). A superordinate condition is a 
situation where actors face a mutual problem or threat which is so critical that it 
cannot be ignored and can only be solved by the cooperative efforts of all the 
actors. Using superordinate goal theory, a model was developed to explain how and 
when cooperative norms might develop among states. 
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Based on this model it was demonstrated that when states interact in the 
presence of superordinate conditions, they will develop cooperative norms to 
regulate their behavior toward solving mutual problems. The resulting norms can 
be formal conventions or informal norms such as cooperative statements. 
The application of norm development to the international level also provides 
a new dimension of international relations theory. Further development of the 
concept may also hold some potential for reduction of conflict among states! 
Overall Conclusions 
In the three category areas of environmental, economic, and political and 
military issues, the presence of superordinate conditions were found to moderately 
strongly explain the emergence of both formal cooperation, as conventions, treaties, 
or agreements, and informal cooperation, as meetings, or cooperative statements. 
Additionally, for the three category areas, high levels of threat from the 
superordinate condition generally did not produce highly intrusive conventions, 
treaties or agreements. That is, they did not result in a loss of state sovereignty 
through intrusive requirements to monitor compliance, nor in the creation of an 
independent authority that could resolve disputes and impose sanctions. 
Some differences were also observed among the three category areas, as to 
when a superordinate condition was more likely to produce formal cooperation. It 
appears that for the environmental, and political and military issues, when the threat 
from the superordinate condition reaches the urgent or crisis level, then states are 
more likely to achieve conventions or treaties. On the other hand, low levels of 
threat appear to produce conventions or treaties for general economic issues. This 
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may indicate that states are more sensitive to perception of costs and benefits in 
general economic coordination issues, and therefore respond at a lower level of 
threat. 
However, in the political and military category, crisis level threats for some 
national security issues may result in highly intrusive treaties or conventions (highly 
developed norm strength). That is, some crisis level national security threats may 
result in highly intrusive monitoring requirements. This may be the case when the 
mutual threat can only be resolved by the use of reciprocal intrusive monitoring 
methods by the states involved. 
From this sample of cases, it appears that both power differences among states 
and the number of states, have virtually no influence on the likelihood of 
development of conventions, treaties, or agreements (formal cooperative norms), nor 
do they influence norm strength development variables, such as the degree of 
monitoring intrusion, when formal norms do result. 
The only condition where power differences may have some influence is when 
the threat is perceived differently by the actors. That is, some view the issue as 
more of a threat than others. When this situation exists, one of the criteria 
necessary for a superordinate condition to be present, is lost, that of a jointly 
perceived threat. Therefore, when states view a threat differently, power differences 
will likely divide states along lines of power, as they pressure for narrow self 
interests, instead of the collective good. In addition, it will be highly unlikely that 
a meaningful convention, treaty or agreement will result. 
With respect to norm strength characteristics associated with conventions, 
treaties, or agreements, this sample of cases suggested that a medium level of 
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dispute resolution capability should be found to occur frequently in all three 
category areas. Also, the level of threat of the superordinate condition does not 
appear to influence the level of the dispute resolution capability, the degree of 
monitoring intrusion, or the degree of sanction authority. 
It can be inferred from this study that low levels of norm strength development 
would be found in the degree of monitoring intrusion and in the degree of sanction 
authority for all three category areas. 
Two exceptions may be found to the general rule of a low degree of monitoring 
intrusion called for in a convention or treaty. One exception relates to national 
security issues, where states may find that a high level of monitoring is required to 
address the mutual threat posed by the superordinate condition. The other may be 
in cases such as high seas fishing, where a given state has many private commercial 
fishing vessels under its authority and the opportunity for any individual vessel to 
take a "free ride" is high. This means they could take advantage of the cooperative 
behavior of other vessels by harvesting more fish than the convention allows. Again, 
in this type of situation, a highly intrusive monitoring requirement may be found in 
the convention. 
Permanent commission appears to be frequently associated with solutions to 
economic, and political and military issues, but not with environmental issues. One 
explanation for this may be in the cost of maintaining a commission, and that 
military or economic issues may be easier to justify the extra expense, as compared 
to environmental problems. 
In contrast, assignment to an existing group appears to be more frequently 
associated with environmental problems. Assignment to an existing group may be 
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viewed as serving the same function as a permanent commission, that is, to create 
an organizational structure with status positions and roles capable of some 
administrative duties. In addition, environmental issues may be assigned to an 
existing group for cost saving reasons noted earlier. 
Three additional questions raised earlier in this study, which are often asked in 
international relations, should also be addressed. These are, when do norms of 
cooperation emerge, how are they maintained, and when do they change? 
The findings of this study suggest moderately strong support for the claim that 
for any issue area, cooperative norms, in the form of conventions, treaties, or 
agreements, will emerge when actors interact in the presence of a superordinate 
threat, and when all actors view the threat with equal alarm, and when they all 
recognize that the threat can only be solved collectively. 
Norms will be maintained, that is, actors will comply with conventions, treaties 
or agreements, so long as the common situation necessitates their cooperation to 
insure that the goal of avoiding or overcoming the threat from the superordinate 
condition is reached. 
Cooperative norms, in the form of conventions, treaties, or agreements, will 
change in response to a change in the threat from the superordinate condition, as 
viewed by the actors. A new level of threat will bring about a new common goal 
for actors to address, and they will be forced by the situation to organize an 
appropriate response to correct the mutual problem. 
Will norms be maintained as conventions, treaties, or agreements if the threat 
from the superordinate condition is reduced or eliminated? Although no specific 
cases were encountered in the data set from which to draw conclusions, the model 
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does not suggest a functional reason for the maintenance of a norm if the condition 
that necessitates it is removed. For example, it could be asked if the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) would disintegrate through member withdrawal and 
other forms of reduced support because the actors no longer perceive a threat from 
the Soviet Union? The model would suggest that unless there were new substitute 
superordinate conditions which would pose threats that NATO could address, then 
it would disintegrate. 
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Applications To Global Problems 
The sponsor of this study, the United States Institute of Peace, along with 
numerous other foundations, international organizations and practitioners concerned 
with international cooperation, all have a common interest in how the findings of 
this study can be applied to current global problems, where cooperation among 
groups is lacking, or when groups are engaged in violent conflict. 
Because this study demonstrated that superordinate conditions could produce 
cooperation among states, even when they viewed each other as enemies, then 
practitioners in conflict resolution and international relations would be interested in 
knowing how state opinion leaders come to recognize superordinate conditions, and 
how they communicate their perceptions of the threat posed by the superordinate 
condition to other states affected. They would want to know what factors prevent 
states from arriving at the same conclusion in their perception of the threat and 
also what elements block or distort perception, such as cultural factors. 
Application of the model to current global problems can be divided into two 
parts, those dealing with efforts to achieve cooperation in the form of conventions, 
treaties, or agreements in the three category areas not involving violence, and those 
efforts to achieve cooperation (a termination of violence) among states that are 
engaged in violent conflict. 
Practitioners do not have to wait for research to clarify the various elements 
that affect perception and communication of the superordinate threat in order to 
apply the model to current efforts to achieve some convention or treaty. They 
should proceed to construct "tools", in the form of a series of group simulations 
designed to help diplomats, state officials, and others involved in negotiations, to 
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understand the basic concepts of a superordinate condition and the functioning of 
the model. 
The model concept of employing superordinate conditions would be of special 
interest to local officials and groups who are faced with the pressing and ongoing 
problems associated with crime, drugs, and poverty. It may be less difficult to find 
superordinate conditions at the local level, around which both the rich and poor will 
rally, which will unite those who live in the inner city slums and the working middle 
class who come from the suburbs, or would unite inner city ethnic groups who are 
often in conflict such as youth gangs. The model could be employed by local 
officials or groups to mobilize cooperation to address the underlying root causes of 
'/iolent crime, gangs, and drugs. If groups come to view these problems as 
superordinate conditions, those of such great importance that they cannot be 
ignored and can only be solved by a united effort then cooperation between inner 
city and suburbs may follow, to realistically address the root causes which are 
poverty and high unemployment. Historically, these have not been viewed as 
threats to the middle or upper class, but now it appears the level of threat to all 
groups is great enough, that a cooperative solution in the form of more employment 
opportunities for inner city youth, more educational opportunities for the low 
income, and meaningful job training that will give individuals a reasonable quality 
of life, may result. 
The simulations can be developed based on Sherifs hypotheses as noted in 
Appendix D. They would consist of three stages, the first being the ingroup 
formation stage, where participants from opposing states, are mixed, and placed into 
separate groups, (which are also isolated from each other). Then each group is 
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allowed to develop into a cohesive unit, to the point that members feel a sense of 
solidarity and belonging to the new group. 
The next stage is to bring the two groups into competition with each other in 
settings where each sees the other as a source of frustration to achieving some 
desired goal. After a series of these competitions, the two groups will eventually 
come to view each other as the "enemy" or outgroups. At this point, they will no 
longer cooperate with each other in common interest activities. 
Once the noncooperation stage has been achieved, the third stage of the 
simulation is initiated. Here, a series of superordinate conditions are introduced to 
the two groups. Recall that these are conditions which both groups find to be so 
threatening that they cannot be ignored, and can only be eliminated by the 
combined cooperative efforts of both groups. 
After a series of these superordinate conditions are successfully addressed, they 
will have reduced their intergroup conflict and have successfully established any 
necessary combined group structure to address the joint threat. In effect, they will 
have evolved a new group and redefined the group boundaries to include each 
other in an all inclusive group. 
It is the process of interaction toward a common threat (superordinate 
condition) that allows each actor to view the other with a sense of solidarity and 
common membership, rather than as an outgroup member, and thus to establish 
a new norm of cooperation. 
These simulations would train key decision makers to recognize superordinate 
conditions, and provide them with an understanding to facilitate the restructuring 
of the group, to achieve their mutual goal of cooperation in addressing the 
85 
superordinate threat through a convention or treaty. 
Practitioners would also be especially interested in the possible application of 
the model to current trouble spots around the world, where states or groups within 
states are engaged in violent conflict, such as those in the Middle East, and Central 
America. 
However, the question of the models usefulness in helping to terminate violent 
conflict is much more complicated than a set of group simulations for various state 
officials. It may be possible to reduce violent conflict between states by the 
introduction of a series of superordinate conditions, which the actors must address. 
Recall that Sherif et al. (1961) demonstrated in a series of controlled experiments, 
that intergroup conflict could be reduced by "superordinate goals". 
However, an important question is, can superordinate conditions be introduced 
to a set of actors who are in conflict at the international level? One problem, is 
to find superordinate condition situations that can be introduced by a third party, 
without the party itself becoming the source of the threat, which would only 
generate a new replacement enemy for the actors to focus on. 
This study did not specifically focus on cases where superordinate conditions 
reduced or terminated violent conflict. It may be possible that such superordinate 
conditions exist, but these have not been identified here. 
For a superordinate condition to move two groups from open warfare with each 
other, to cooperation in a fight against a new mutual threat, the ne\^ threat posed 
by the superordinate condition must be viewed by both states as more important 
than the violent threat posed by their current enemy. 
An understanding of the type of superordinate condition and other parameters 
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that could reduce or end violent conflict, would be of paramount interest to 
practitioners. Research focused on superordinate conditions as they relate to cases 
of states in violent conflict should be encouraged. This should include how states 
recognize and communicate their perception of threats. 
To summarize the application of the findings to current global problems, it is 
recommended that practitioners use the model to develop a series of training 
simulations, which will move participants through the stages of ingroup formation, 
competition over resources (outgroup formation), and intergroup cooperation 
through introduction of superordinate conditions. 
The training simulations can be applied at the international level for diplomats 
and others engaged in efforts to foster cooperation. They can also be employed at 
the local level within the nation, to facilitate group collective action in solving 
regional or local problems, such as, pollution, unemployment, health care and so on. 
Practitioners should set up training programs to disseminate the simulation 
tools. For example, at the international level, dissemination could take place in 
U.N. sponsored training programs, and through seminars .within various inter­
governmental organizations. At the local and regional level, dissemination programs 
should be encouraged as in city to city cooperation in addressing interrelated 
problems of drugs, crime, poverty, and unemployment. The simulation could also 
be designed for use in elementary schools, to teach cooperation and conflict solving 
skills to students. 
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Limitations Of The Stnd  ^
This study examined only international interactions and assumed states to be 
the actors. The study did not examine the internal dynamics of factors that may 
influence a nation's position on any particular issue. However, a study of such 
factors would complement this study, for example, an understanding of the internal 
mechanisms affecting perception of threat could help actors to perceive the threat 
as being at the same level of importance. 
A scale was developed to measure the level of threat posed by the superor-
dinate condition based on the assumption that states are rational in their calculation 
of cost, in terms of loss of human life or economic loss, and they would therefore 
respond in some observable pattern. It was assumed that all states would view the 
importance of loss of life or the economic costs with the same ranking order. The 
ranking order along with the threshold for each level of threat could be further 
researched and the measure fine tuned. 
It would also be desirable to find a simpler measure for threat level, other than 
lives and economic costs, because the time required to gather such data is very 
large. 
Additionally, the measures used to identify the parameters of norm strength 
were also very time consuming to collect. Simpler measures for these variables may 
exist. Also the measures employed for informal norms (meetings, and public 
statements) were found to be inadequate. It is recommended that better measures 
be developed for informal norms. Such measures may give some insight into the 
negotiation sequence of interaction that states move through toward formal 
conventions or treaties. 
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Although moderately strong support was indicated for superordinate conditions 
to generate conventions or treaties, some care should be exercised before 
attempting broad generalizations on what superordinate conditions are capable of, 
with respect to international cooperation. 
Because only 26 cases were utilized from the three category areas, the study 
should be viewed as contributing more toward a new theoretical perspective and 
only as exploratory at the empirical level. 
Future Research 
A number of areas of research are suggested to complement the findings of 
this study. These are presented as two focus areas, applications development, and 
further theoretical and case supported research. 
It is strongly recommended that applications development be provided by 
supporting efforts to develop group simulation tools for use by various practitioners, 
and to insure that when these sets of tools become available, that they are widely 
disseminated to international and local practitioners. 
A number of areas for further research has been noted earlier in the 
conclusions. These include research aimed at understanding how states perceive 
threats and how they establish a rank for their relative importance. Also an 
understanding of how perceptions of common threats are communicated. 
A third area of key interest is the relationship of superordinate conditions to 
the reduction of violent conflict. A long scale historic analysis of the influence of 
superordinate conditions on conflict reduction could provide an understanding of 
the potential effectiveness of introducing a superordinate condition to states 
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currently engaged in violent conflict. 
A more through understanding of these areas would complement the findings 
of this study and allow for even greater practical application in solving pressing 
world problems of cooperation and reduction of violent conflict. 
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APPENDIX; A. DATA, ENVIRONMENTAL CASES. 
Case 1. Chernobyl Accident 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a special session 
and enacted two conventions within 6 months of the accident (explosion and fire on 
April 26, 1986, conventions signed on September 26, 1986). The total economic 
cost of the accident has not been officially assessed, but it would likely run well into 
the billions of dollars. Soviet and U.S. scientists predict 24,000 deaths from fallout 
induced cancers over a 70-year period, with 3,500 to 70,000 cancer cases, approx­
imately half of which might be fatal (Von Hippel and Cochran 1986:24) 
The intensity of the threat from the superordinate condition was recorded as 
crisis, in that the loss of life was estimated to be 24,000 deaths, the event came as 
a surprise, and the response came within 6 months. 
The number of actors in the set was recorded as ^ (the number of states with 
nuclear reactors). The power level of the state actors was recorded as 13 high 
(Belgium, Britain, Canada, Finland, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Nether­
lands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.S.) 17 middle (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Iran, North Korea, Mexico, Poland, 
Romania, South Africa, Taiwan, U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia) and 2 low (India, Pakistan). 
Some of these states signed with reservations, that is, that they would not be bound 
by the dispute resolution procedures of the convention. This requires a dispute 
between states or between a state and the IAEA to be settled by negotiations within 
1 year or it must be submitted to arbitration or the International Court of Justice. 
Those with reservations to the dispute settlement article were Bulgaria, China, 
Cuba, France, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, Democratic Re­
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public of Korea, Turkey, and the United States. 
Norm development was recorded as convention. Two conventions were signed 
on September 26, 1986. One convention was to establish an early warning system 
for nuclear accidents with mandatory reporting. The second established a 
framework to facilitate assistance in the event of an accident. This required 
signatories to give assistance to any country affected. 
The norm strength variables were recorded as follows: the degree of monitoring 
intrusion was recorded as low because neither convention had articles relating to 
intrusive monitoring other than prompt reporting of information on accidents and 
periodic updating of key contact personnel. The dispute resolution capability was 
recorded as medium because both conventions specified disputes be settled by 
arbitration or the International Court if earlier negotiations fail. The degree of 
sanction authority was recorded as low because no sanction provisions were 
specified. Permanent commission was recorded as no because no new commission 
was created. Assignment to an existing group was recorded as yes because duties 
were assigned to the existing IAEA (International Legal Materials 1986:1370). 
Case 2. Fallout, Nuclear Weapons Testing 1957 
Controversy over nuclear weapons testing sharpened as hydrogen bomb tests 
began. The concern focused on two aspects of the weapons race: first the 
increasing risk of nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviets, and second, the 
direct effects of radioactive fallout from atmospheric testing. The Federation of 
American Scientists on March 6, 1955, proposed that a U.N. commission study the 
dangers from thermonuclear tests. They suggested an international authority was 
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needed to evaluate the radiation threat to genetic damage and suggested that "the 
Soviets are just as susceptible to this common danger to long term health" 
(Federation of American Scientists 1955:185-186; and Lapp 1955:339). Concern over 
fallout and radiation increased after the U.S. exploded its first H-bomb in 1954 
(Genetics 1955:314; and Westergaard 1955:327). By 1957, numerous scientists were 
warning of the dangers of continued testing, including the British Atomic Scientists 
Association, which on April 16,1957, stated that H-bomb tests could produce bone 
cancer in 1000 people for each million tons of TNT equivalent produced by the test 
(British Atomic Scientists Association 1957:202) 
Eugene Rabinowitch, Editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, warned 
that the continued testing would lead to additional cases of bone cancer, leukemia 
and genetic damage into the tens of thousands (Rabinowitch 1957:201). Dr. Linus 
Pauling stated on April 30,1957, that 10,000 persons were already dying or had died 
of leukemia throughout the world as a result of atmospheric nuclear tests (Facts 
1957a:139). 
The U.S. Public Health Service disclosed May 10, 1957,-plans for monitoring 
fallout contamination in milk in five areas of the U.S., after Dr. Arnold Kurlander, 
assistant to the U.S. surgeon general, reported (May 7) traces of Strontium-90 and 
Cesium-137 in the U.S. milk supply (Facts 1957b: 332). The Japanese welfare 
minister warned April 18, 1957, that Japan's atmosphere was becoming con­
taminated from Soviet nuclear tests (Facts 1957c: 130). And the U.S. Joint Congres­
sional Atomic Energy Committee in a report in its June hearings on radioactive 
fallout noted a statement of 12 leading scientists, that if tests in the next several 
years equaled those of the past 12 years, the bones of children living in the 
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northeastern U.S. and southern Canada could contain 10-25% of the maximum 
permissible dosage of cancer producing Strontium-90 (Factsd 1957:306). 
From the preceding information, the intensity of threat of the superordinate 
condition was recorded as Compelling. This was based on estimates of 1000 new 
cancer cases as a result of the fallout. Also the response (a test moratorium) came 
within two years of the major warnings from scientists. 
The number of actors in the set was recorded as 3. The power level of the 
actors in the set was recorded as 2 high (U.S. and Britain) and 1 middle (Soviet 
Union). 
The norm outcome was recorded as no resolution but with informal cooperation 
in the form of meetings toward negotiating a test ban, and statements indicating 
cooperative official support for a test ban. In addition the U.S. and U.S.S.R. 
observed a voluntary test moratorium from November 1,1958 to September 1,1961 
which could also be viewed as an informal cooperative signal of support for an 
eventual formal test ban. 
There were no recorded data for norm strength because a formal agreement 
did not result. 
Case 3. Fallout, Nuclear Weapons Testing 1962 
With the collapse of the testing moratorium and the resumption of atmospheric 
testing in August 1961, scientists and health experts again began to warn of the 
public health cost of continued weapons testing. On August 23, 1962, Minnesota 
began a program to withdraw dairy cows from pasture and feed hay that had been 
aged at least 21 days to reduce the relatively high levels of radioactive iodine-131 
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in the cows' milk (Facts 1962a:290). Iodine-131 is a byproduct of atmospheric 
nuclear weapons tests and is carried by winds until eventually settling on the ground, 
including pasture where it is consumed by the dairy cows. It is passed through the 
milk to humans where it is concentrated in the thyroid. Because it is radioactive, it 
poses a cancer danger and is especially threatening to children and the elderly. 
The U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) Committee on Radiation, reported June 
5, 1962, that the U.S. radiation monitoring program would cost $100 million per 
year. Dr. Russell Morgan, chair of the PHS and chief radiologist of the Johns 
Hopkins Hospital, testified before a joint Congressional Atomic Energy 
Subcommittee on June 7, 1962, that continued Soviet atmospheric testing might 
make it necessary to remove contaminated milk from the diet of children and 
pregnant women. He noted the accumulated evidence that radiation directed to the 
neck and throat of infants and children may induce cancer of the thyroid after the 
elapse of a number of years. It was also noted that children in some parts of Iowa 
and Minnesota had already received the maximum level of thyroid exposure. Sev­
eral reports were noted from April through August of increased levels of radioactive 
fallout in U.S. food supplies in southern states, the midwest, Utah and New York 
(Facts 1962b: 291). 
From the above, the intensity of threat from the superordinate condition was 
recorded as urgent. This was based on the thousands of lives endangered by cancer 
and the $100 million cost of monitoring each year. In addition, the response of the 
actors was within two years of the resumption of testing in 1961. 
The number of actors in the set was recorded as 3. The power level of the 
actors in the set was recorded as 2 high (U.S., Britain) and 1 low (U.S.S.R.). 
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Norm development was recorded as treatv. the Partial Test Ban Treaty also 
called the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer 
Space and Under Water. 
Norm strength was recorded as follows: The degree of monitoring intrusion was 
recorded as low because the treaty made no requirement for monitoring. The 
dispute resolution capability was recorded as low because there was no specifica­
tion of a method for resolving disputes. The degree of sanction authority was 
recorded as low because no sanction provision was included other than giving three 
months advance notice of intent to withdraw. Permanent commission was recorded 
as no as none was established, and assignment to existing group was recorded as no, 
although the U.N. disarmament commission has communicated proposals to the 
superpowers on disarmament topics (Osmanczyk 1985:589-590). 
Case 4. Mediterranean Sea Pollution 
In the early 1970s, reports warned of the growing pollution threat to the 
Mediterranean Sea. In 1971 and 1972, coastal Mediterranean states became 
concerned that pollution was causing a reduction in tourism, after states were forced 
to close beaches and swimming areas due to dangerous bacteria levels firom 
untreated sewage (Lewis 1972:26). In 1971, Prince Rainier of Monaco, in response 
to loss of tourism, called for a cleanup of pollution (Prince Rainier 1971:21). 
In 1973, noted French biologist. Dr. Alan Bombard warned that pollution was 
destroying the Mediterranean. He noted the rapid decline of fish populations and 
pointed out that in 10 years, there would not be a single tuna left in the Mediter­
ranean (anchovies were nearly gone and sardines were also in decline). Some of 
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the decline of the fish population was due to over-fishing but the main factor was 
pollution which destroyed spawning grounds. Bombard noted that 25 years ago, one 
tuna egg out of 100,000 would reproduce a tuna, but today only one egg out of five 
million stands a chance of hatching. He also pointed to the large coastal cities that 
surround the Mediterranean as a major source of pollution. Their untreated sewage 
has caused numerous coastal beaches, waters and shellfish to become unsafe due 
to dangerous levels of bacteria (Bombard 1973:51). 
During the summer of 1973, after incidents of cholera and hepatitis outbreaks 
along Italian beaches began to spread, representatives from most of the major 
Mediterranean cities met in Beirut. They concluded that the Mediterranean "has 
reached the danger point for the survival of the population living around it" (Linn 
1974:1-12). The result was the Beirut Charter, which calls for creation of an 
International Code to control pollution in the Mediterranean. 
It was estimated that by 1974, the Mediterranean Sea received 100 million tons 
per year of industrial waste and untreated sewage and 300,000 tons per year of oil 
residue. This level was expected to double over the next few years if conditions 
remained unchanged (Linn 1974:9). 
A study published in 1975 by Dr. Maurice Aubert, Director of the Centre 
d'Etude et de Recherches de Biologie et d'Oceanographie Medicale (CERBOM), 
found that mercury levels in 17 of 31 species examined exceeded the maximum safe 
level (the species included tuna, swordfish, crab, shrimp and red mullet). It was 
reported that the Mediterranean received an estimated 65 tons per year of mercury 
from the chemical industry alone and additional amounts were contributed from 
agricuture, the electronics industry and paper mills (Dorozynski 1975: 549). 
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By the mid-1970s, scientists were warning that a person who ate an average of 
2 kilos of fish fi-om the Mediterranean per week risked blindness, paralysis and 
ultimately death fi-om slow mercury poisoning. They stated that mercury levels in 
tuna, mullet, dogfish and other species caught off the French and Italian Riviera 
had reached three times the level believed safe for human consumption (Keesing 
1976:27675). 
From this review of events, the level of threat from the superordinate condition 
was recorded as urgent. This was based on reports and studies published in 1972 
and 73 noting pollution levels, tons of waste per year, declining fish populations and 
loss of tourism. No specific dollar figures were cited giving estimates of the cost of 
the pollution. However, it could be assumed that the cost in loss of fish revenue 
and tourism alone would be in the billions of dollars per year. Also a formal 
response came within two years, that is, negotiations in 1974 and a draft of an 
Action Plan in 1975 (Keesing 1975:27012). 
The number of actors in the set was recorded as 18. The power level was 
recorded as 4 high (France, Israel, Italy, Spain) and 11 middle (Cyprus, Egypt, 
Greece, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Yugoslavia). 
Albania, Algeria and Syria did not sign immediately. 
Norm development was recorded as convention, the Convention for the 
Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, signed February 16, 1976. 
Norm strength variables were recorded as follows: The degree of monitoring 
intrusion was recorded as low. The convention required only reporting. The dispute 
resolution capability was recorded as medium. Disputes would be settled by an 
arbitration tribunal. The degree of sanction authority was recorded as low. None 
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was specified. Permanent commission was recorded as no. Assignment to existing 
group was recorded as yes, the U.N. Environmental Program (International Legal 
Materials 1976:285-310). 
Case 5. Chloroflnorocarboii (CFC) Ozone Threat 1985 
CFCs are a chemical compound used in re&igerators, polystyrene plastics and 
for cleaning in the electronics industiy. When released, they rise to the stratosphere 
where they break down the ozone which protects the earth from harmful ultravio­
let solar radiation. Warnings about the dangers of CFCs to the ozone have been 
around since the mid-1970s, but it was a report published in October of 1986 
describing a drop in ozone over the Antarctic that triggered increased international 
concern (Facts 1986:965). Prior to this, there were numerous meetings and 
statements on the consequences of depletion of the ozone layer. 
A November 1981 report by scientists from the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) warned that a 1% 
increase in ozone depletion would result in a 2% increase in cancers and that a 5% 
ozone depletion could result in a 10% increase in skin cancers (Facts 1982a:392). 
A National Academy of Science report released in March of 1982, suggested that 
the ozone depletion rate would not be as high as earlier estimated but would be 
reduced by 5-7% in a hundred years if the 1977 rates of CFC release were 
continued. The report said a 1% drop in ozone could result in a 10% increase in 
certain cancers. 
From the preceding discussion, the intensity of threat of the superordinate 
condition was recorded as compelling. This was based on the estimated 10% 
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increase in skin cancers. It was assumed that the cost of this cancer impact would 
at least be in the tens of millions of dollars. Also the response of the 1985 
convention came within three years of the more recent scientific findings of the CFC 
threat. 
The number of actors in the set was recorded as 52 and the power level of the 
actors (signing March 22, 1985) was recorded as 12 high (Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, West Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland and U.S.) and 8 middle (Argentina, Byelorussia, Chile, Egypt, Greece, 
Peru, Ukraine, U.S.S.R.). The major producer or consumer nations that have not 
signed were, 9 high (Australia, Austria, Britain, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, 
New Zealand, Spain), 10 medium (Brazil, Guatemala, Hungary, Maldives, Malta, 
Mexico, Morocco, S. Korea, Taiwan, Portugal), and 13 low (Burkina Faso, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, Thailand, Togo, 
Uganda China, India). Developing countries currently use only 1% to 3% of the 
world's CFCs but their production and consumption will be expanding as in China, 
which plans to increase production by a factor of ten in the next few years (Keesing 
1989a:36785). 
Norm development was recorded as no resolution and convention (a convention 
to protect the ozone was signed in March 1985 by the above listed states but a 
protocol with measures to reduce CFC production was not agreed to). The 
convention did indicate cooperative intent and therefore informal norm development 
was recorded as statements and meetings. 
No variables of norm strength were recorded because the convention placed no 
specific obligations on countries. 
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Case 6. CFC Ozone Threat 1986, Antarctic Hole 
Global attention became strongly focused on the threat to the ozone after 
studies in 1985 and 1986 revealed a hole in the ozone over Antarctica. An EPA 
report in 1985 noted a 20% reduction in ozone would result in 3.7 million more 
cases of skin cancer per year. The higher levels of ultraviolet light would also 
damage plants and livestock, and possibly disrupt the food chain by destruction of 
plankton and other aquatic larvae in the oceans (Ozone layer 1985:25). 
The most extensive recent study on the threat to the ozone was reported March 
15, 1988, by the World Meteorological Organization and the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA). The study suggested that the ozone was being 
depleted at a rate of 6% per year. 
During the period from 1969-1986, the ozone level over a large part of the 
northern hemisphere (covering Europe, North America and northern Asia) fell by 
between 1.7% and 3%, with a 6.2% loss in the northernmost areas. An even 
greater rate of depletion was noted in the Antarctic zone (Facts 1989a:966). The 
report indicated the ozone loss was primarily due to increased levels of CFCs in the 
atmosphere (Keesing 1989b:36785). 
The banning in the 1970s of CFCs in the US was estimated to have cost $1.5 
billion. The EPA estimated in 1986 that a 1% increase in ultraviolet light level 
would cause one million additional skin cancers and 20,000 extra deaths in a life 
time for the U.S. population alone (Keesing 1988:35678). 
From the preceding information, the intensity of threat of the superordinate 
condition was recorded as Urgent. This was based on the EPA estimates of 20,000 
extra deaths per lifetime and that the response of the actors (a 1987 protocol to the 
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1985 convention) was within two years of the 1985 convention. The number of 
actors in the set was recorded as ^ and the power level was recorded as the same 
as for case 5, except Australia, Austria, Britain, Iceland, Japan, Luxembourg, Israel, 
New Zealand, and Spain signed bringing high power actors to 21, and Maldives, 
Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Portugal, Panama, and Philippines, middle signed, bringing 
the total to 12 medium, Burkina Faso, Congo, Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Thailand, Togo and Uganda, signed in addition to those listed for case 5 
bringing its total to 10 low). The power level of those not signing was 6 medium 
(Brazil, Guatemala, Hungary, Peru, S. Korea, Taiwan) and 3 low (China, Equatorial 
Guinea, India). 
Norm development was recorded as convention, the Protocol for the Protection 
of the Ozone. The protocol provided for cutting consumption of CFCs by 85% by 
the end of the century. It was hoped that the reduction would keep ozone 
depletion to within 2% per year; however, the convention did not call for cutting 
production. 
Norm strength variables were recorded as follows: Degree of monitoring 
intrusion was recorded as low. Reporting was required. Dispute resolution 
capability was recorded as low, with no provision for settlement of disputes. Degree 
of sanction authority was recorded as low, with no sanction provision. Permanent 
commission was recorded as no, none specified, and assignment to an existing group 
was recorded as yes, as the U.N. Environmental Program would assess progress. 
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Case 7. CFC Ozone Threat 1989 
In November 1988, the European Community Commission on Environment, 
called for the "virtual elimination" of CFCs due to the accumulating evidence of the 
threat posed by continued production of CFCs. In February 1989, European Com­
munity Ministers agreed to ban all CFCs by the year 2000 and to make an 85% cut 
as soon as possible. On March 2, 1989, the 12 members of the European 
Community agreed to ban all CFC production by the year 2000. During a 
conference in London in March, 1989, aimed at strengthening the 1987 ozone 
protocol, the Chinese delegation advocated the creation of a ozone layer protection 
fund financed by the major producers and consumers of CFCs. Also President Moi 
of Kenya called on the developing countries to "bear the burden of conserving the 
global ozone layer equitably with the less industrialized nations" (Keesing 
1989c:36785). Leaders from the less developed nations made it clear that the 
wealthy nations should compensate them for their sacrifices (not damaging the 
ozone with CFCs as the North had). 
At another conference in Helsinki held May 2,1989, the .first official gathering 
of the parties to the ozone protocol, a declaration of intent to halt all CFC 
production by the year 2000 was made and signed by 79 representatives (the 
declaration was not binding). Also at this conference key industrialized states like 
the United States and Britain moved to block the establishment of an international 
climate fund to assist poor nations in developing technologies needed to produce 
alternatives to CFCs. However, they agreed to set up a working group to examine 
how less developed countries could be assisted, including a possible international 
fund. 
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On September 26, 1988, Lee Thomas, head of the U.S. EPA, stated that the 
ozone protocol does not go far enough to pro-tect the ozone layer. He noted that 
the damage to the ozone was greater than previously thought and only a complete 
elimination of CFCs could curtail future damage. An EPA report stated that 
chlorine levels in the atmosphere would continue to grow for another 6 or 8 years 
(Crawford 1988:25). 
From the preceding discussion, the intensity of threat of the superordinate 
condition was recorded as Urgent. This was based on the EPA report that chlorine 
levels (from CFCs) would continue to grow for 6 or 8 years. The number of actors 
in the set was recorded as 24. The power level of the actors was recorded as the 
same as in case 6. 
Norm development was recorded as no resolution: although the 12 members 
of the European Community agreed to ban CFCs by the year 2000, other major 
producers of CFCs did not join so the outcome was recorded as no resolution. 
Informal norm development was recorded as meetings and statements. This was 
based on actor participation in the conferences noted earlier. Because the 
agreement was a nonbinding resolution, then no norm strength variables were 
recorded. 
Case 8. Transboimdaiy Acid Rain 
Scientists say that the destruction of trees in the Black Forest of Germany is 
so bad that "Germany cannot afford to wait until scientists have results, it is most 
urgent to seek a European wide agreement" (Walgate 1983:742). As recently as 
1984 the West German Government estimated that acid rain had damaged or killed 
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more than half of their forests (Facts 1984:958). 
The British Department of Energy noted that 3% of British emissions of sulfur 
dioxide goes to West Germany, 4% to Norway and Sweden and 30% remains in 
Britain (Beardsley 1984:740). 
Canada's Minister for the Environment told the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science on June 1, 1983, that tens of thousands of lakes are now 
fish-less in northeast Canada. He noted that most of the damage comes from U.S. 
power plants and that an emission cut of 50% could be paid for by a 2% annual 
increase in electric bills for those areas affected (Germany 1983:680). 
A commission of the European Economic Community (EEC) estimated that 
acid rain could cost the jobs of 47,000 forest workers in West Germany alone (Cross 
1983:835). 
The Eurpoean Economic Community has recently stated that 560,000 hectares 
of trees have already been completely destroyed in West Germany. West Germany 
has committed $1.6 billion to cut air pollution (Pearce 1983: 834), and in 
neighboring Czechoslovakia, the damage due to acid rain has been estimated to 
be between $1-1.25 billion (Csepel 1984:10). 
In June 1984, a multilateral conference on causes and prevention of damage 
to forests and waters by atmospheric pollution in Europe, requested the executive 
body of the 1979 convention on long range transboundary pollution, as a matter of 
highest priority, the adoption of a proposal for a specific agreement on reduction 
of annual emissions or transboundary fluxes. 
From the above review, the intensity of threat from the superordinate condition 
was recorded as urgent. This was based on economic costs estimated to be in 
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excess of $3 billion for West Germany and Czechoslovakia alone. In addition, the 
response of the actors was within two years of a call for action in 1983 by the West 
German government and from the EEC in 1984. 
The number of actors in the set was recorded as 27 and the power level of the 
actors (signing) was recorded as 14 high (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, West Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland) and 7 middle (Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, 
East Germany, Hungary, Ukraine, U.S.S.R.). Those not signing were 4 high 
(Britain, Ireland, Spain, U.S.) and 2 medium (Turkey, Yugoslavia). 
Norm development was recorded as convention, a protocol to the 1979 
Convention On Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution To Reduce Sulfur 
Emissions By 30%. The protocol called for reduction of sulfur emissions by 30% 
by 1993 based on 1980 levels. 
Norm strength was recorded as follows: The degree of monitoring intrusion was 
recorded as low, only reporting required. Dispute resolution was recorded as 
medium, arbitration or the International Court. Degree of sanction authority was 
recorded as low, none specified. Permanent commission was recorded as no, and 
assign to existing group was recorded as yes, U.N. Environmental Program 
(International Legal Materials 1988:707). 
Case 9. Drift Net Threat 
According to the U.S. Office of International Fisheries, approximately 500 
Japanese fishing vessels deploy 30,000 miles of drift nets during a typical fishing trip. 
Environmental groups claim that at any given time, 700 fishing vessels from Japan, 
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South Korea and Taiwan string out tens of thousands of miles of plastic nets in the 
Pacific Ocean. The nets are used mainly to catch squid and other species such as 
tuna. Environmental groups claim the nets are extremely destructive toward marine 
life, because they trap anything that swims into them and a large amount of marine 
life swims within 40 feet of the surface where the nets are suspended. Typically the 
nets are 40 feet by 30 miles (Anderson 1988:26). 
In 1986 Greenpeace warned that the nets kill thousands of dolphins, porpoises, 
birds and other sea animals. They also contribute to the decline of some fish 
populations, such as the North American salmon. Japan claims that the reports 
of the damage caused by the nets are exaggerated (No net gain 1986:14-16). 
Australian scientists estimate that Taiwanese and Japanese drift net fleets took 
some 35,000 tons of tuna in 1988, twice the amount thought to allow stocks to 
regenerate. With South Korea also using drift nets, the catch of various species is 
expected to rise (Wall 1989:60). Scientists and environmentalists fear that drift nets, 
within a few years, will deplete virtually everything that lives in the upper 50 feet 
of the Pacific Ocean, where the nets are used, thereby leading to an ecological crisis 
(Egan 1989:1). 
Citing the ecological threat to the $2 billion per year in various species that the 
Pacific yields, the United States, Australia and other countries want to ban the use 
of drift nets. 
From the preceding discussion, the intensity of threat from the superordinate 
condition was recorded as compelling. No specific economic cost has been 
estimated for the present impact of the nets but it is assumed to be at least in the 
millions of dollars due to falling stocks. Also the response came within 3 years of 
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protests by scientists, as the U.S., Japan, South Korea and Taiwan began 
negotiations on a drift net treaty. 
The number of actors in the set was recorded as 5 and the power level of the 
actors was recorded as 3 high (Canada, Japan, and the United States) and 2 middle 
(South Korea and Taiwan). 
Norm development was recorded as bilateral and no resolution (because of the 
inability of the bilateral treaties to ban or assure regulation of drift nets, the 
outcome was recorded as no resolution). Bilateral treaties have been agreed to 
between the United States, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. On June 23,1989 the 
United States and Japan agreed to a bilateral treaty (Drift Net Act of 1987). The 
agreement allowed 46 observers (32 Japanese, 9 American and 5 Canadian) to be 
placed on Japan's squid fleet of approximately 470 vessels. Japan refused to allow 
electronic transponders to be installed on the vessels (this tells monitoring aircraft 
or satellites the exact location of the vessels). Japan will provide data on catches 
(Facts 1989b:533). Japan is also negotiating a drift net treaty with Canada. 
Taiwan agreed to allow transponders to be placed on its entire fleet by 1990 
and allow boarding of any vessel found outside the regulated zone (McCedie 
1990:14). 
Informal norm development was recorded as meetings and statements. This was 
based on the formal and informal meetings toward bilateral treaties. Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan were all opposed to a convention. 
Norm strength variables were recorded as follows: For the bilateral treaty 
between Japan and the United States, the degree of monitoring was recorded as 
high. Observers are allowed. Dispute resolution capability was recorded as medium. 
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with settlement by arbitration or the International Court. Degree of sanction 
authority was recorded as low, none was specified. Permanent commission was 
recorded as no, and assignment to an existing group was recorded as no. 
Case 10. Carbon Dioxide Greenhouse Threat 
Experts from 35 countries met in Geneva under the U.N. Environmental 
Program and the World Meteorological Organization on November 9-11, 1988. 
They agreed to set up three working groups called the intergovernmental panel on 
climate change, headed by the U.K., U.S.S.R. and U.S. 
The panel would assess scientific evidence on global warming, its impact on the 
environment and agriculture and would formulate responses including possible 
negotiations toward a global convention by mid-1990 (Keesing 1989d:36540). 
In June 27-30, 1988, 300 scientists, environmentalists and government officials 
representing 48 nations attended a conference in Toronto. They agreed that 
greenhouse gases would warm the globe by 1.5-4.5 degrees C before the middle 
of the next century. Sea levels would rise by 0.3-1.5 meters, and there would be 
more rain in the tropics and less rain in temperate regions. They called for a 20% 
reduction in carbon dioxide by 2005 and an eventual 50% reduction Keesing 1989e: 
36784). 
The predicted changes would bring unprecedented temperatures (Ramanathan 
1988:239). According to Stephen Schneider of the National Center for Atmospheric 
Research, the greenhouse effect "is one of the best established theories in at­
mospheric science". It is suggested that major changes in the global climate are vir­
tually certain by the middle of the next century (Tangley 1988:14-17), with the 
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climate of Britain becoming like Spain and the grain belts of the midwest United 
States becoming more like Ethiopia (Tudge 1988:70). 
A Conference on The Protection of the Global Atmosphere held in The Hague, 
Netherlands on March 11, 1989, called for the development within the framework 
of the U.N., of a "new institutional authority" to combat global warming. The body 
would be empowered to monitor governments' performance in controlling 
atmospheric pollution, to enforce compliance through the International Court, and 
to compensate, using an atmospheric fund, third world countries affected by steps 
taken to protect the environment (Keesing 1989f:36785). 
From the preceding discussion, the intensity of threat from the superordmate 
condition was recorded as urgent. This was based on the projected costs that could 
result from inaction. No specific dollar figures of damage were given but the costs 
even in the early stages of lower rain fall would result in losses in the tens of 
billions of dollars. Additionally, the response firom actors in terms of conferences, 
came within two years of the heightened profile of the greenhouse effect (in 1986-
87 the General Science Index reported 35 entries on the greenhouse effect, in 1987-
88, 35 more entries were reported and in 1988-89, 124 entries on the greenhouse 
effect were reported). 
The number of actors was recorded as 4^ the number of countries with officials 
at one of the major conferences. The power level of the actors was not recorded. 
As negotiations begin toward a draft of a convention, power level may be a factor 
for determination of burden sharing between the industrialized and developing 
countries. 
Norm development was recorded as no resolution. However, informal norms 
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were recorded as meetings and statements, based on the conferences and 
cooperative statements by various actors. 
Norm strength variables were not recorded, as no agreements have been 
reached. 
Case 11. Hazardous and Toxic Waste Damping. 
Toxic waste dumping in the third world is another case. In the mid-1980s 325 
million tons of hazardous waste were generated each year worldwide with 90% of 
it by the industrialized nations. Only about 2% of the wastes were shipped 
internationally (Keesing 1989g:36788). However, pressure to export is increasing 
because waste which costs $2,500 per ton to dispose of in the U.S. and Europe, 
costs only $2.50 per ton to dispose of in a developing country. The reason for the 
lower cost is that there are few laws in the developing countries to ensure safe 
disposal (Vir 1989:24). 
Greenpeace estimated in a report published in November 1988, that 3.7 million 
tons of waste of all types were shipped from North to South in 1986-88, including 
over 100 cargos of toxic and hazardous waste. Mostafa Tolba, U.N. Environmental 
Program Executive Director, has noted that only about 20% of the hazardous waste 
generated in the industrialized nations is shipped to developing countries. Typical 
destinations include Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Morocco, Panama, Uruguay, and 
several states in sub-Saharan Africa. 
In 1988, the discovery of several open dump sites in West Africa where toxic 
chemicals and industrial wastes had been dumped by European and U.S. companies 
increased global fears about public health. Examples include: 1) Guinea Bissau 
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which accepted 6 million tons of chemical waste per year for several years for $600 
millon; 2) one million tons of waste containing oil, acids, solvents, and mercury to 
be dumped in the Congo; 3) the state of Benin agreeing to take 5 million tons of 
industrial waste from North America and Europe; and 4) Zimbabwe accepting 1500 
gallons of hazardous waste from the U.S. armed forces to be dumped into 
phosphate mine pits (Keesing 1989h: 36788). 
Another problem is that developing countries are poor and need hard currency 
for foreign exchange, so they allow dumping of waste in exchange for cash. One 
other aspect of the problem is that developing countries can have weak bureaucrac­
ies and corruption where salaries are low. 
In May 1988, the Organization of African Unity (GAU) resolved that its 
members would refrain from accepting toxic waste into their countries. In June 
1988, the Economic Community of West African States declared it a criminal 
offense for anyone to import dangerous wastes. 
In January 1989, developed and developing countries met in Dakar to draft a 
treaty on hazardous waste shipments. A sharp difference emerged between the 
position of the developing countries that called for a total prohibition on such 
shipments and the position of the industrialized countries which did not want a ban 
on toxic trade but rather increased monitoring of exports. The U.S. and Japan also 
opposed drafts that would require prior informed consent by the importing country 
and the prohibition of export of waste unless the importers means of handling the 
waste are as environmentally sound as those of the exporter. 
On March 20, 1989, a treaty to regulate transboundary hazardous waste 
shipments was signed by 34 countries (no African states signed, nor did the U.S., 
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U.K., or West Germany). During the treaty conference, Malian President and 
Chair of the OAU Moussa Traore condenmed the industrialized countries which 
had "not hesitated to use Africa as a dumping ground"; he further stated that 
African countries could not sign "unless [their] interests were safeguarded" (Keesing 
1989i:36789). The treaty specified that exporting countries would be obligated to 
ensure that the waste would be managed in an environmentally sound manner, that 
exports be permitted only if the country of origin did not have means or a suitable 
site for environmentally sound disposal, and that the exporting country should have 
a written assent from the importing country for each cargo. 
The treaty did not have any of the amendments proposed by the African states: 
1) waste producing countries would be liable for the wastes ultimate disposal, 2) the 
export of waste to countries not possessing the same level of facilities and 
technology as the exporting nation would be prohibited, and 3) sophisticated 
verification procedures including the inspection of disposal sites would be introduced 
(Keesing 1989j:36541). 
From the preceding discussion, the intensity of threat from the superordinate 
condition was recorded as compelling. Although no specific figures were noted on 
deaths or sickness from the wastes, it assumed that the health cost in terms of 
sickness and disability and eventual death that will result from wastes being dumped 
in an environmentally unsafe manner will at least be in the tens of millions of 
dollars. 
The number of actors in the set was recorded as 39 and the power level of the 
actors (signing) was recorded as 15 high (France, Italy, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Israel, Liechtenstein, 
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Luxembourg, Saudi Arabia, Spain) and 18 medium (Bahrain, Bolivia, 
Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Mexico, Panama, Philippines, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela) 
and 2 low (Afghanistan, Haiti). Those not signing were 4 high (Britain, West 
Germany, Japan, U.S.) and 14 low (Burldna Faso, Burundi, Congo, Cameroon, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mexico, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Togo, Zimbabwe). 
Norm development was recorded as both convention and no resolution. 
Although a treaty was signed by 35 nations on March 23,1989, it had no provision 
for monitoring or sanctions and neither the major producers of wastes like the U.S., 
U.K. and West Germany nor any of the African countries where much of the wastes 
are shipped signed the treaty. Informal norms were recorded as statements (not 
cooperative) and meetings. 
Case 12. Threat to Rainforests 
It is estimated that tropical forests are being lost at a rate of 11.5 million 
hectares per year. As forests are cleared, thousands of plants, animals and insects 
are lost forever. The genetic resources of the tropical forests are very important 
to global agriculture because plant breeders look to the rainforests as a genetic 
reservoir as they search for disease and drought resistant genes (Keesing 
1989k:36793). 
The forests are also vital to the pharmaceutical industry, since a quarter of all 
prescription drugs were originally derived from plants and millions of unanalyzed 
species in tropical forests are threatened with destruction. The loss of the potential 
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pharmaceutical on a global scale has not been estimated, but given that 25% of the 
$8 billion worth of drugs that Americans alone spend each year come from plants, 
the loss to the drug industry from destruction of undiscovered species, could be well 
into the billions of dollars per year (Famsworth 1988:83). 
The cost of food crop species, natural pesticides, fats, oils and fiber lost due to 
forest destruction would be difficult to establish but would likely be in the billions 
of dollars on a world wide scale. For example, consider the $8 million market 
generated from a single new species of tomato recently discovered (Plotkin 
1988:106-111). 
In the West African state of Cote d'lvore, commercial logging and cash crop 
farming have moved the countries tropical forests to near extinction. In 1965, the 
forest covered 15 million hectares, today only 1 million hectares remains and it is 
still being lost at a rate of 300,000 hectares per year, and replanting amounts to 
only 5000 hectares per year (Bourke 1988:24). It appears that the main sources of 
loss are timber exports and local farmers, who, with government encouragement, cut 
down forests and plant export crops of coffee and cocoa. 
In the tropical rain forests, once the forest is gone, the land can be quickly 
eroded, silting up rivers and degrading fisheries. The deforestation would also affect 
the global climate by adding to the greenhouse effect. Carbon dioxide released when 
forests are cut and burned is estimated to add 20% to the total carbon dioxide 
emitted each year. 
From the preceding review, the intensity of the threat from the superordinate 
condition was recorded as compelling. This was based on an assumed cost estimate 
of damage or economic loss due to forest destruction and loss of species of at least 
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$50 million. 
Norm development was recorded as no resolution. This was based on the fact 
that no convention exists nor are formal efforts underway toward drafting a 
convention to protect tropical forests. Informal norms were recorded as meetings 
and statements. This was based on a conference in 1987 by the U.N. where 
participants endorsed a tropical forest action plan drafted in 1986 by the World 
Resource Institute which called for several protection measures. In 1988, Brazil 
denounced international pressure to save the rainforests as ecological imperialism 
and in May 1989, at the Andean Pack meeting, Brazil urged regional governments 
to exercise their sovereign rights over such resources (Keesing 19891:36793). 
The number of actors in the set was recorded as 24 (Brazil and Indonesia 
contain 43% of the world's forests, other states in the set were those where major 
deforestation threats exist). The power level of the actors was recorded as 9 high 
(U.S., U.K., Japan, France, West Germany, Italy, Deimiark, Sweden, Switzerland), 
4 middle (Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Brazil) and 11 low (Laos, Nepal, 
Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, India, Burma, Kampuchea, Papua New Guinea, 
Brunei, Zaire). 
Norm strength variables were not recorded because there was no convention. 
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APPENDIX B. DATA: ECONOMIC CASES 
Case 1. Aviation Standards 1919 
There are several accounts that describe the evolution and development of 
commercial aviation and transatlantic carriers. However many of these historical 
accounts do not provide information in terms of costs of accidents and lives lost. 
Rather for the purpose of recording data, as the number of transborder carriers and 
transoceanic flights increased in frequency, it is assumed that rational states 
recognized the need for a common policy on aviation, so as to avoid accidents and 
ensure passengers a safe and reliable flight-
Based on the above assumption, the intensity of threat from the superordinate 
condition was recorded as compelling. The number of actors in the set was recorded 
as 5 and the power level of the actors was recorded as 5 high (U.S., Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy). 
Norm development was recorded as convention, the Air Paris Convention of 
1919, approved by the Great Powers Supreme Council on September 27, 1919 was 
ratified by 33 states (American Journal of International Law 1920). 
Norm strength variables were recorded as follows: Degree of monitoring 
intrusion was recorded as low, none were specified. Dispute resolution capability 
was recorded as medium. Disputes would be settled by a commission (technical 
issues), otherwise settlement by arbitration or the International Court. Degree of 
sanction authority was recorded as low, with no specification of sanctions. 
Permanent commission was recorded as yes. The International Commission for 
Civil Aviation was set up to carry out the functions of the convention. Assignment 
to existing group was recorded as no. 
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Case 2. International Air Routes (ICAO) 1944 
At the end of World War II, disputes emerged between U.S. British, French 
and Dutch air carriers over who would have access to the transatlantic air routes 
and landing rights at major ports of entry between Europe and North America, 
Latin America and Africa (Foreign Relations 1944). The historical account of 
events preceding the formation of a revised International Air Transportation 
Regime does not describe events in terms of frequency of accidents or economic 
losses. Rather it is assumed that states as rational actors recognized their common 
dilemma in the need to coordinate and share access to air routes so as to assure 
that the collective good of air transportation would not be lost. 
Therefore the intensity of threat from the superordinate condition was recorded 
as compelling. The number of actors was recorded as 8. The power level of the 
actors was recorded as 4 high (Britain, Canada, France, U.S.) and 4 middle 
(Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, U.S.S.R.). 
Norm development was recorded as convention, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization, December 7, 1944. 
Norm strength variables were recorded as follows: Degree of monitoring 
intrusion was recorded as low, with reporting required. The dispute resolution 
capability was recorded as medium, with settlements by arbitration or the 
International Court. Degree of sanction authority was recorded as low, with none 
specified. Permanent commission was recorded as ye^ the International Civil 
Aviation Organization. Assignment to an existing group was recorded as no 
(Department of State Bulletin 1945). 
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Case 3. Telecommunications Coordination (TTU) 1932 
International radio communication developed quickly as radio technology and 
power transmission levels advanced in the 1920s. Transmitted voice broadcast first 
occurred in 1920. As "short wave" technology was developed, the number of 
international broadcasters grew. By 1930, nearly all the major powerful countries 
had scheduled international broadcasts. To prevent interference with transmissions, 
states recognized the need to cooperate in coordinating use of the limited radio 
spectrum resource. It was realized that without a formal organization to arrange 
cooperation, that interference free broadcasts could not be assured, chaos would 
result and the use of the resource would be lost (Graves 1941). 
Therefore the intensity of the threat from the superordinate condition was 
recorded as compelling. The number of actors in the set was recorded as The 
power level of the actors was recorded as 6 high (Germany, France, Britain, Italy, 
Japan, U.S.) and 19 middle (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, South 
Africa, Denmark, Spain, Finland, N. Ireland, Belgian Congo, U.S.S.R., Czechos­
lovakia, Sweden, Portugal, Norway, Netherlands, Greece, Luxembourg). The (37) 
low power states were not recorded but the list can be found in Foreign Relations 
of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1932 (Foreign Relations 1948). 
Norm development was recorded as convention, with the International 
Telecommunication Convention being signed December 7, 1932. Norm strength 
variables were recorded as follows: The degree of monitoring intrusion was recorded 
as low, requiring exchange of data. Dispute resolution capability was recorded as 
medium, requiring disputes to be settled by negotiation or arbitration. Degree 
sanction authority was recorded as low, with none being specified. Permanent 
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commission was recorded as yes, with the creation of the International Telecom­
munications Union. Assignment to existing group was recorded as no. 
Case 4. International Trade (GAIT) 1948 
From 1900 through 1940, high tariffs had been erected to protect domestic 
industries. In 1930, the Smoot-Hawley Act raised tariffs to 47% on imports 
(Brockway 1944). This tended to reduce overall international trade as countries 
reciprocated with tariffs of their own. After World War II, there was an urgent 
need to rebuild Europe and establish strong open trade policies to help the post 
war economies to develop. Toward this goal, several nations engaged in a series 
of meetings to create a draft to reduce barriers to international trade. The aim was 
to raise the standard of living, reach full employment and full use of resources by 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to reduction of tariffs 
and other discriminatory barriers to free trade (Chronology 1944). It was estimated 
that benefits from elimination of tariffs would benefit U.S. trade alone by some 
$250 million (Foreigh Relations 1947). 
From the preceding, the level of intensity of threat from the superordinate 
condition was recorded as compelling. This was based on the estimated economic 
cost. 
The number of actors in the set was recorded as 58 (the number of indepen­
dent states in 1948). The power level of the actors was recorded as 9 high 
(Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Britain, U.S.) and 5 middle (Brazil, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, New Zealand, South 
Africa) and 9 low (Burma, Ceylon, Chile, China, India, Lebanon, Pakistan, 
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Rhodesia, Syria). The above 23 actors negotiated the original tariff reductions. 
Norm development was recorded as treaty, with the General Agreements on 
Tariffs and Trade, established January 1, 1948. 
Norm strength variables were recorded as follows: The degree of monitoring 
intrusion was recorded as low. The dispute resolution capability was recorded as 
medium, with the use of arbitration or the International Court. The degree of 
sanction authority was recorded as medium, with binding decisions by the 
International Monetary Fund in specific areas. Permanent commission was recorded 
as yes. Assignment to existing group was recorded as no. 
Case 5. International Debt Crisis 
The Group of 77 (includes 127 developing countries) met in Caracas and called 
for a reduction of debt balance as a solution to their $1.3 trillion debt burden (Facts 
1989c:549). The debt crisis, which began in 1982, has caused many Third World 
governments to reduce support of social welfare programs in order to meet the 
interest payments on their debt. The result for some was social upheaval. For 
example, Venezuela experienced riots February 27-March 1, 1989, after imposing 
higher prices for basic commodities in order to meet the payment demands of 
international lending organizations. The result was 300 dead, 1000 injured and 
4,500 arrested (Facts 1989d:138). In September 1989, Brazil, the largest debtor 
nation among the developing countries, announced it would be unable to meet its 
interest payment of $1.6 billion (Facts 1989e:687). A number of other countries are 
in a position similar to Venezuela, and are unwilling to pay the price of social 
unrest to meet their interest payments. Rather they are following the lead of 
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Mexico in demanding reduction of debt and rescheduling of interest payments. 
Mexico experienced net outflows of $56 billion in debt service payments since 1982, 
and in July 1989 reached an agreement with the U.S. to reschedule its debt. 
Mexico defaulted on $80 billion in outstanding loans in 1982. The agreement with 
the U.S. would reduce debt service payments from 6% of GDP to 2.7%, a savings 
of about $3 billion per year (Facts 1989f:548). 
From the preceding, the intensity of threat from the superqrdinate condition 
was recorded as urgent. This was based on the number of deaths in the case of 
Venezuela and the typical annual costs in interest payments of approximately $3 
to 5 billion. The economic collapse of one or more major debtor nations in the 
developing world could cause an economic crisis in first world banks. 
The number of actors in the set was recorded as 24 (17 highly indebted 
countries plus the group of 7 high income states). The power level of the actors 
was recorded as 7 high (U.S., Japan, West Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Canada,) 
and 15 middle (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Philippines, Morocco, Uruguay, Yugoslavia) and 
2 low (Cote d'Ivoire, Niger). 
Norm development was recorded as no resolution. However cooperative 
bilateral agreements are being negotiated. Informal norms of meetings and 
statements were recorded. Some statements could be recorded as not cooperative 
as when debtor states announce they are unwilling to pay the interest on their debt 
or when lenders are unwilling to reschedule debt payments or reduce the debt 
outstanding. 
Norm strength variables were not recorded because no collective agreement 
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has resulted. 
Case 6. Seabed Authority, Law of the Sea 
In the late 1970s technology was being developed that could enable companies 
to mine minerals from the ocean floor (Facts 1982b:320). Developing countries 
view the wealth of the ocean floor as a "common heritage" that should benefit all 
nations and so view mineral recovery from the seabed by industrialized nations as 
a threat to their own future development. In 1975, negotiation began among 
industrialized and developing countries over a new law of the sea treaty. The treaty 
was to regulate a number of ocean resource issues including recovery of minerals 
from the seabed, national boundaries, economic zones, environmental pollution by 
ships, and fishing disputes. After 6 years of highly divided negotiations, a Law of 
the Sea Treaty was completed and approved by 130 in favor, 4 against and 17 
abstentions. The U.S. voted against the treaty due to inclusion of a seabed 
authority which would regulate seabed mining. The other nations who voted against 
the treaty included Israel (which voted no due to inclusion of the PLO), and Turkey 
and Venezuela (who voted no due to disagreement over territorial waters). 
The 17 abstentions were cast by the European Community and the Soviet Bloc. 
Japan and France voted in favor of the seabed authority. The treaty would have 
settled disputes through an International Tribunal or the International Court. 
From the preceding discussion, the intensity of threat from the superordinate 
condition was recorded as compelling. No specific economic loss figures are cited, 
but it is assumed that losses resulting from pollution, over-fishing, and so on would 
be at least in the millions of dollars. 
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The number of actors in the set was recorded as 151 (number of sovereign 
states). The power level of the 117 who signed the convention, was recorded as 13 
high (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, 
Kuwait, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden), 55 middle and 49 low. The 
power level of those who did not sign was 10 high (Belgium, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland, Britain, West Germany, U.S.), 9 medium 
(Ecuador, Holy See, Jordan, Libya, Oman, Peru, South Korea, Samoa, Venezuela) 
and 4 low (Benin, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Zaire). The complete list can be 
found in International Legal Materials (International Legal materials 1982a:1477). 
Norm development was recorded as no resolution. No resolution was recorded 
despite the fact that 130 nations voted for the treaty, because the effectiveness of 
the treaty would be in question due to the lack of support of several of the major 
industrialized nations. Informal norm were recorded as meetings and statements. 
Some of these statements were cooperative and some not, with the division along 
the lines of developing and industrialized countries (the industrialized states opposed 
the creation of a Sea Bed Authority that would regulate sea bed activities). 
Norm strength variables were recorded as follows: The degree of monitoring 
intrusion was recorded as high. It allows inspection by placement of observers on 
ships, as in fishing vessels. The dispute resolution capability was recorded as 
medium. The treaty calls for an international tribunal with binding arbitration or use 
of the International Court. The degree of sanction authority was recorded as high. 
The tribunal authority can impose fines. Permanent commission was recorded as 
yes, a Law of the Sea Council was established. Assignment to an existing group was 
recorded as no (International Legal Materials 1982b:1261-1354). 
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Case 7. Oil Cartel 
In February 1959 and again in August 1960, the major oil companies reduced 
their oil prices without consulting the producing countries. The August 1960 price 
reduction cost the producing countries $93 million in lost revenues (Rouhani 1971). 
These actions led to a meeting of the representatives of the governments of Iran, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela in Baghdad on September 9, 1960. On 
September 14, 1960, they had reached an agreement of a permanent inter­
governmental federation known as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). The organization was formed as a response to a perceived 
threat to their oil revenues. This is indicated in OPEC's first two resolutions: 
"Members shall demand that oil companies maintain their prices steady and free 
from unnecessary fluctuations, that members shall endeavor by all means available 
to them to restore present prices to the levels prevailing before the reduction. That 
they shall ensure that if any new circumstances arise that in the estimation of the 
oil companies necessitates price modification, the said companies shall enter into 
consultation with the members affected to fully explain the circumstances. Second: 
The principal aim of the organization shall be the unification of petroleum policy 
for the member countries and the determination of the best means for safeguarding 
the interests of member countries individually and collectively." 
Thus the intensity of the threat from the superordinate condition was recorded 
as urgent. This was based on the economic loss of $93 million. The number of 
actors in the set was recorded as 5 (the original members perceiving the threat). 
The power level of the actors was recorded as 5 middle (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait and Venezuela). By 1980, the members consisted of the original group plus 
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Qatar, Libya, Indonesia, United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador and 
Gabon, 
Norm development was recorded as agreement, with the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) being formed September 14, 1960. 
Norm strength variables were recorded as follows: The degree of monitoring 
intrusion was recorded as low, requiring only the reporting of production data. 
Dispute resolution capability was recorded as low, because none was specified. 
The degree of sanction authority was recorded as low. It did not call for sanctions 
but for execution of resolutions by good faith of members. Permanent commission 
was recorded as ye^ with the establishment of a formal intergovernmental 
organization. Assignment to existing group was recorded as no. 
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APPENDED G DATA, POLITICAL AND MILITARY CASES 
CASE L Antiballistic Missile Development 
As antiballistic missile (ABM) systems moved toward becoming operational in 
1967, scientists warned of the dangers that could result. For example, one 
superpower invests in an ABM system and the other side opts to react with 
emphasis on offensive capability to negate the protective effects of the ABM system. 
This leads to an uncontrolled offense-defense race with no equilibrium point (Young 
1967; Rodberg 1967). The cost of such a race would be large, with an ABM system 
estimated to run near $30-40 billion. 
The ABM has been further suggested to be destabilizing in that a country may 
assume it has relative impunity to a nuclear attack and so it makes a first strike. 
Also simple deployment of an ABM itself raises the general level of tension 
between the superpowers (Martin 1967). Another compelling argument is that the 
cost effectiveness of an ABM would be too expensive and could be nullified by the 
cheaper offensive weapons. Thus, for example, a $10 billion investment in 
offensive missiles would require $1000 billion in an ABM system to offset it 
(Brennan 1967). 
From the preceding discussion, the intensity of threat from the superordinate 
condition was recorded as crisis. This was based on the estimated cost of $30-40 
billion for an ABM system plus the instability that such an operational system would 
have on superpower tensions. 
The number of actors in the set was recorded as 2. The power level of the 
actors was recorded as 1 high (U.S.) and 1 middle (U.S.S.R.). 
Norm development was recorded as bilateral treatv. the treaty between the 
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United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of Antibllistic Missile Systems, 
May 26, 1972. 
Norm strength was recorded as follows: The degree of monitoring intrusion was 
recorded as low, provision for use of national technical means for assurance of 
compliance. Dispute resolution capability was recorded as medium, provision for 
parties to establish a standing committee to address questions of compliance and 
to provide technical information. The degree of sanction authority was recorded 
as low, none was specified. Permanent commission was recorded as yes, a standing 
committee was established. Assignment to existing group was recorded as no (ABM 
Treaty 1973). 
Case 2. Strategic Anns Race, SALT H Treaty 
Deterrence has been the key basis for achieving stability and excluding the 
likelihood of a nuclear attack between the superpowers for several years. The idea 
of deterrence is to deter the other side from using nuclear weapons by assuring 
that a nuclear retaliation would inflict unacceptable damage on their country. The 
idea of deterrence requires that a nuclear weapon system -could absorb a "first 
strike" and still be able to retaliate and cause unacceptable damage. 
This concept of stable deterrence began to weaken in the 1970s, due to the 
development of new technologies that allowed for smaller nuclear warheads, where 
several could be placed on a single missile and highly accurate guidance systems 
that could enable each nuclear warhead to be targeted independently, thus several 
targets could be hit with a single missile. This technology was called Multiple 
Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRV). 
The impact of MIRV was to destabilize deterrence because they are 
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"counterforce" weapons which are targeted at the other side's nuclear weapons 
(Cesce 1982). Thus the advancing technology moves the nuclear states from the 
relative stability of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD, the holding of each other's 
populations and industrial infrastructures hostage) to an unstable state where one 
side views its weapons as threatened and therefore is moved to adopt a launch on 
warning policy, otherwise known as "use them or lose them". It is further 
destabilized in that in crises situations, both sides are operating on a hair trigger out 
of fear of losing their ability to strike back after receiving a first strike against their 
own nuclear forces. 
In 1977, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute warned of the 
steadily increasing probability of nuclear war due to advances in technology which, 
when applied to nuclear weapons, leads to first strike capability and due to the 
failure of arms control to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons. 
In addition, Herbert Scoville warned that in the five years since SALT II 
negotiations began in 1972, the U.S. had doubled its nuclear arsenal and employed 
MIRV technology. He noted that if the increasing risk of nuclear devastation is 
to be stopped, the superpowers must halt the application of new technologies into 
nuclear weapon systems (Scoville 1977). 
In 1974, the Soviets tested four new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 
three of them employed MIRV technology. The U.S. also deployed MIRVs on its 
Minuteman and Poseidon missiles ('Impermissible' 1974). 
From the preceding discussion, the intensity of threat from the superordinate 
condition was recorded as crisis. This was based on the potential millions of deaths 
that would result from a nuclear war, plus the increased cost associated with the 
142 
arms race which is in the billions of dollars annually. In addition the crisis level was 
based on the suggestion by various experts of the increased risk of nuclear war. For 
example, for 27 years the "clock" of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has 
symbolized the threat of nuclear war, with midnight being doomsday. In 1972 the 
minute hand was moved ahead to six minutes to midnight, in recognition of the 
increased threat from the continued superpower nuclear weapons buildup and 
movement toward a first strike capability allowed by MIRV and other new 
technologies (Day 1974). 
The number of actors in the set was recorded as 2. The power level of the 
actors was recorded as 1 high (U.S.) and 1 middle (U.S.S.R.). 
Norm development was recorded as bilateral treatv. with the signing of the 
Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, on June 18, 1979 (the treaty 
was not ratified by the U.S. but both actors have honored the treaty). 
Norm strength was recorded as follows: The degree of monitoring intrusion was 
recorded as low, with provision for assurance of compliance through national 
technical means, notification of flight tests and exchange of data. Dispute resolution 
capability was recorded as medium. Provisions were made for a standing committee 
to address questions of compliance. The degree of sanction authority was recorded 
as low, none was specified. Permanent Commission was recorded as yes, with the 
establishment of a permanent standing commission. Assignment to existing group 
was recorded as no (Facts 1979). 
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Case 3. Aircraft Hyaddng 
According to the International Civil Aviation Organization, during the period 
between 1960-70, there were 280 attempted hijackings of which 74 were unsuccess­
ful. In 1969, 57 aircraft hijackings were reported worldwide. In 1970, four aircraft 
were destroyed by hijackers (one September 6, in Cairo and three September 12 in 
Jordan). They were valued at a total of $24.4 million (Facts 1970). 
Based on the preceding information, hijacking is viewed as a threat to aviation 
safety. The intensity of threat from the superordinate condition was recorded as 
compelling. This was based on the economic impact of the destruction of the four 
aircraft, as well as the cost of delays caused by hijacking or attempts. This puts the 
cost in the tens of millions of dollars. The number of actors in the set was 
recorded as 119. The power level of the actors was recorded as 15 high (Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Japan, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Britain, U.S., West Germany), 25 middle (Argentina, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Byelorussia, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Greece, 
Hungary, Iran, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, 
Thailand, Trinidad, Turkey, Ukraine, U.S.S.R., Venezuela, Yugoslavia) and 10 low 
(Afghanistan, Barbados, Cambodia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana). 
Norm development was recorded as convention, with the establishment of the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, December 16,1970. 
Norm strength was recorded as follows: The degree of monitoring intrusion was 
recorded as low, with no provision for monitoring. Dispute resolution capability was 
recorded as medium, with a provision for binding arbitration or settlement by the 
International Court. The degree of sanction authority was recorded as low, because 
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there was no provision for sanctions. Permanent commission was recorded as no, 
none was established. Assignment to existing group was recorded as no. 
Case 4. Third Woiid Ballistic Missile Race 
In 1988, at least 20 Third World nations either already possessed ballistic 
missiles or were developing the technology to produce them. The missiles are 
viewed as a destabilizing threat to peace and could escalate a small conflict into 
high levels of death and destruction, because they are relatively easy to develop, 
they have a range of 600-1000km and can carry a typical explosive payload of 500 
kg (Karp 1988). While the accuracy can vary according to the technology used, the 
destructive impact of the missiles was demonstrated in the Iran-Iraq "war of the 
cities" (Stockholm 1988). 
Based on the thousands of deaths that resulted from the role of the missiles in 
the Iran-Iraq war, the level of threat from the superordinate condition was recorded 
as urgent. Besides the potential deaths that could result from use of such missiles, 
the industrialized countries could also perceive the missile capability to be a threat 
to their peace in that a regional war could disrupt major parts of the world's 
economic system, costing millions of dollars in disruption of resources. 
The number of actors in the set was recorded as 27. The power level of the 7 
actors who signed was recorded as 7 high (U.S., Britain, Canada, France, Italy, 
Japan, West Germany). The 20 states that did not sign were 1 high (Israel), 16 
middle (Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, 
South Korea, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey) and 3 low 
(India, Pakistan, South Yemen). 
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Norm development was recorded as convention and no resolution. However, 
attempts by the industrialized countries to establish a convention to control missile 
technology resulted in the International Missile Technology Control Regime signed 
April 16, 1987 by the U.S., Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan and West 
Germany. Because the third world countries and the East Bloc countries refused 
to sign, the outcome was also recorded as no resolution. Informal norms of 
meetings and (noncooperative) statements were recorded. Norm strength variables 
were not recorded. 
Case 5. Iran-Iraq War 
After a long series of border incidents, the war began September 17,1980 when 
Iraq abrogated its treaty with Iran over the Shatt al-Arab waterway and fullscale air 
and artillery exchanges took place September 20-22, 1980. The war quickly 
escalated to attacks on petroleum facilities of both sides (October 1980), and large 
scale ground attacks (1981-82), then air and missile attacks an each other's cities 
(1983-85), tanker attacks (1984), attacks on oil ports (1986), more large scale 
ground attacks (1987). By 1988 Iran had postponed its annual ground offensive due 
to a shortage of soldiers and Iran was also suffering most of the burden in the 
attacks on each other's cities. Finally, in March 1988, Iraq used poison gas killing 
at least 5000. By August 1988, it was estimated that the conflict had cost 100,000 
civilian deaths and 900,000 military deaths. The economic cost was estimated to be 
between $200 billion and $400 billion. The damage to oil facilities alone was 
estimated to be $2.8 billion for Iran and $8 billion for Iraq. Oil revenue losses were 
estimated to be $23 billion for Iran and $65 billion for Iraq (Facts 1988a:622; 
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Stockholm 1989a:343). It was also estimated that international arms merchants 
made a total of $40 billion in sales to both sides during the war (Brozoska 1987). 
If the deaths and economic costs imposed are viewed as a threat to both sides, 
then the intensity of threat from the superordinate condition could be recorded as 
crisis. One question would be at what point during the war did the condition for 
a crisis level threat to both sides become fulfilled? It would appear that the crisis 
level would have been met early in the war. By 1983, deaths were already into the 
thousands and economic damage was into the billions of dollars in losses. However, 
the war continued until 1988. 
The number of actors in the set was recorded as 2 and the power level of the 
actors was recorded as 2 middle (Iran and Iraq). 
Norm development was recorded as agreement, with the establishment of a 
U.N. mediated cease fire and negotiations. 
Norm strength was recorded as follows: The degree of monitoring intrusion was 
recorded as high, allowing for on site U.N. peacekeeping observers. Dispute 
resolution capability was recorded as medium, with both sides agreed to submit to 
mediation. The degree of sanction authority was recorded as low, none was 
specified. Permanent commission was recorded as yes, with the stationing of U.N. 
observers. Assignment to existing group was recorded as ves. with the use 
of U.N. peace-keeping forces. 
Case 6. Israel-Palestine Conflict 
The Palestinian uprising (intifada) began in the Gaza Strip on December 9, 
1987 and quickly spread to Jerusalem and the West Bank. The uprising has been 
147 
attributed to frustrations of 20 years of Israeli military occupation and the failure 
to achieve a peaceful settlement. 
Incidents of violence have grown more extreme between Israeli soldiers and 
Palestinians (there have also been some conflicts between Jewish settlers and 
Palestinians). 
As of June 15, 1989, the 18-month uprising had cost an estimated 715 
Palestinian and 45 Israeli deaths, between 15,000 and 20,000 Palestinian wounded, 
and 50,000 Palestinian arrests with 13,000 remaining in jail (Stockholm 1989b:344; 
Facts 1988b;961-962). 
If the economic costs for the intifada could be estimated it would likely be in 
the billions of dollars. 
Based on the preceding estimates of deaths and the estimated economic costs, 
the intensity of threat from the superordinate condition was recorded as compelling. 
The number of actors in the set was recorded as 2 and the power level of the 
actors was recorded as 1 high (Israel) and 1 middle (Palestine-the occupied 
territories). 
Norm development was recorded as no resolution. However, numerous peace 
initiatives and unofficial communications between the two sides have indicated a 
cooperative attitude at least during 1989 (Facts 1989g:7). Informal norms of 
meetings and cooperative statements were recorded. 
Norm strength variables were not recorded because no formal agreement has 
yet been reached. 
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Case 7. Pakistan-India Arms Race 
On February 5,1989, Pakistan announced it had successfully tested its first long 
range surface to surface missile (Keesing 1989m:36466). On December 31, 1989 
Benazir Bhutto, Prime Minister of Pakistan and Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime minister 
of India, signed an agreement to exchange detailed information on nuclear power 
and research facilities and to refrain from attacking each other's nuclear installa­
tions. They also announced that they were considering reductions in military 
strength. The announcement took place during the fourth summit meeting of the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation held in Islamabad (Keesing 
1989n:36485). 
For 1988, it has been estimated that India spent over $8 billion on military 
expenditures and Pakistan was estimated to have spent nearly $2.5 billion 
(Stockholm 1989c:320). 
Based on the preceding military expenditures, the intensity of threat of the 
superordinate condition was recorded as urgent. The number of actors in the set 
was recorded as 2 and the power level of the actors was recorded as 2 low (India 
and Pakistan). 
Norm development was recorded as no resolution. However, it appears that 
tensions have eased after Bhutto became Pakistan's Prime Minister. Based on the 
December 31, 1989 meeting between Pakistan and India, informal norms 
(cooperative) were recorded as meetings and statements. 
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APPENDIX; D. SHERIF S HYPOTHESES 
Shérifs theory of intergroup behavior can be presented as a series of 
hypotheses relevant to each stage of his experiment. These are summarized as 
follows (Sherif et al., 1961:260). 
Stage 1: Experimental Formation of Ingroups 
Hypothesis 1: "A definite group structure consisting of differentiated status 
positions and reciprocal roles will be produced when a number of individuals 
(without previously established interpersonal relations) interact with one another 
under conditions (a) which situationally embody goals that have common appeal 
value to the individuals, and (b) which require interdependent activities for their 
attainment". 
Hypothesis 2: "When individuals interact under conditions stated in the first 
hypothesis, concomitant with the formation of group structure, norms regulating 
their group behavior in relation to one another and in practices and activities 
commonly engaged in will be standardized". 
Stage 2: Production of Unfavorable Intergroup Attitudes 
Hypothesis 1: "In the course of competition and frustrating relations between 
two groups, produced by goals whose attainment precludes their attainment by the 
other, unfavorable stereotypes will come into use in relation to the outgroup and 
its members and will be standardized in time, placing the outgroup at a certain 
social distance. In other words, the rudiments of prejudice will result". 
Hypothesis 2: "The course of relations between two groups which are in a state 
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of competition and frustration will tend to produce an increase of ingroup 
solidarity". 
Hypothesis 3: "Functional relations between groups which are of consequence 
to the groups in question will tend to bring about changes in the pattern of relations 
within the ingroups involved. For example, we found that leaders who had been 
successful in peaceful activities sometimes lost their standing when intergroup 
conflict became focal for a group". 
Stage 3: Reduction of Intergroup Friction 
Hypothesis 1: "Contact between groups does not in itself produce a decrease 
in an existing state of intergroup hostility, even though the conditions of contact may 
be pleasant in themselves. We found that such occasions were utilized to spite and 
harass the other group". 
Hypothesis 2: "When groups in a state of friction are brought into contact 
under conditions embodying superordinate goals whose attainment is compellingly 
desired by each group, but which cannot be achieved by the efforts of one group 
alone, they will tend to cooperate toward the common goal". 
Hypothesis 3: "Cooperation between groups, necessitated by a series of 
situations embodying superordinate goals, will have a cumulative effect in the 
direction of reducing existing conflicts between groups and unfavorable attitudes of 
individual members". 
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APPENDIX E. STATISTICAL CROSSTABULATIONS 
Crosstabulations and statistics are provided using SPSS, in the following pages 
and in the following order: for all cases combined, environmental cases, economic 
cases, and political and military cases. 
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BY NORMDEV 



















2 8 . 6  
2 






































ACTOR POWER DIFFERENCE BY DEGREE OF NORM STRENGTH 
ECONOMIC CASES 
APD ACTOR POWER DIFFERENCE 
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  
BY NORMSTR 
O F  - - - - - - - - -

























60 .0  
COLUMN 5 5 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
'•* STATISTICS CANNOT BE COMPUTED WHEN THE NUMBER OF NON-EMPTY ROWS OR COLUMNS IS ONE ••• m o\ 
NUMBER OF ACTORS BY NORM DEVELOPMENT 
ECONOMIC CASES 
NACTORS NUMBER OF ACTORS 
C R O S  S  T A B U L 
BY 
A T I  O N 
NORMDEV 













2 8 . 6  
100.0 
2 8 . 6  









COLUMN 2 5 7 
TOTAL 28.6 71.4 100.0 
»»» STATISTICS CANNOT BE COMPUTED WHEN THE NUMBER OF NON-EMPTY ROWS OR COLUMNS IS ONE *•* 
H 
o\ 
NUMBER OF ACTORS BY DEGREE OF NORM STRENGTH 
ECONOMIC CASES 
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  O F  - - - - - - - - -



















COLUMN S 5 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
STATISTICS CANNOT BE COMPUTED WHEN THE NUMBER OF NON-EMPTY ROWS OR COLUMNS IS ONE *** 
SUPERORDINATE CONDITION BY NORM DEVELOPMENT 
POLITICAL AND MILITARY CASES 
SC SUPERORDINATE CONDITION 
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  
BY NORMDEV 



























































CRAMER'S V 1.OOOOO 
SUPERORDINATE CONDITION BY DEGREE OF NORM STRENGTH 
POLITICAL AND MILITARY CASES 
SC SUPERORDINATE CONDITION 
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  
BY NORMSTR 
O F  - - - - - - - - -





ROW PCT HIGH 
COL PCT TOTAL 
TOT PCT 
66.7 33.3 75.G 
100.0 66.7 





































ACTOR POWER DIFFERENCE BY NORM DEVELOPMENT 
POLITICAL AND MILITARY CASES 
ACTOR POWER DIFFERENCE 
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  
BY NORMDEV 








































































CRAMER'S V O.16667 
ACTOR POWER DIFFERENCE BY DEGREE OF NORM STRENGTH 
POLITICAL AND MILITARY CASES 
APD ACTOR POWER DIFFERENCE 
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  
BY NORMSTR 
O F  - - - - - - - - -



























































CRAMER'S V 1.00000 
NUMBER OF ACTORS BY DEGREE OF NORM STRENGTH 
POLITICAL AND MILITARY CASES 
NACTORS NUMBER OF ACTORS 
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  
BY NORHSTR 
O F  - - - - - - - - -







































ONE TAIL TWO TAIL 
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NUMBER OF ACTORS BY NORM DEVELOPMENT 
POLITICAL AND MILITARY CASES 
NACTORS NUMBER OF ACTORS 
C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N  
BY NORMDEV 












































ONE TAIL TWO TAIL 4^ 
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